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THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF

ICSID IN

LATIN AMERICA
Ignacio A. Vincentelli*
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this article is to research the historical interaction of the
International Centre for Settlement of In vestment Disputes (ICSID) and
Latin America in an effort to suggest that the recent ICSID-unfriendly
measures taken by some Latin American countries might not be an aberrational phenomenon in the region.
If, moved by the engine of ideology, the rest of Latin America follows
the example of Bolivia and Ecuador (the most radicalof the ICSID-hostile
countries) and denounces the Washington Convention, instead creating a
new forum to resolve FDI disputes at the regional level (as was recently
proposed), the future of ICSID in Latin American becomes uncertain.

THE

1. INTRODUCTION

story of State-investor dispute resolution is one that relates to

the process of decision-making that transnational corporations undertake in risk factor analysis when considering whether to invest
capital in a particular country (jurisdiction). In this sense, the international community has created a variety of international dispute or resolution methodologies, including the Washington Convention for Settlement
of Investment Disputes ("Washington Convention or the ICSID Convention"),' and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes ("ICSID"), that enable less developed countries ("LDCs") to
signal the Community of Nations, particularly, and perhaps most significantly, capital-exporting countries, that they have embraced a system of
protection of foreign direct investments ("FDI"). 2 Once sent, these sigauthor is an attorney in Memphis, Tennessee. Abogado from the Universidad
Catolica Andres Bello, in Caracas, Venezuela (2005); LL.M. from Duke University
School of Law (2007); and, J.D. from the University of Miami School of Law
(2009). He isgrateful for the helpful comments of Professors Keith Rosenn, Pedro
Martinez Fraga, and Jan Paulsson of the University of Miami School of Law, as
well as his colleague Thomas J. Pate on earlier versions of this paper.
1. See Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, List of Contracting States and Other
Signatories of the Convention, 2010, http://icsid.worldbank.org/lCSID/Front~ervlet?requestType=ICSI DDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&language=English
[hereinafter ICSID List] (for a comprehensive list of the 156 contracting states
signatories of the Washington Convention (as of Nov. 4, 2007)).
2. Thbomas L. Brewer, Int'l Inv. Dispute Settlement Procedures: The Evolving Regime
for Foreign Direct Inv., 26 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 633, 634 (1995); see also
*The

409

410

LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 16

nals transform into 'credible commitments' to treat foreign investors
fairly. 3
The attitude of Latin American countries toward the Washington Convention and the ICSID has been convoluted throughout time and meaningfully disconcerting. During the first decades of its existence virtually
all Latin American countries stayed away from the ICSID, preferring to
adopt a system of "internationalization" of foreign investment contracts,
to ensure foreign investors' respect for their investments. 4 In the 1990s
these countries radically changed their policies. In just a few years the
vast majority of Latin American countries became signatories of the
Washington Convention, and entered into several bilateral investment
treaties ("BITs") with other nations. 5 These steps were taken as essential
means in the competitive effort of attracting foreign capitals. 6
But recent political events and foreign policy precepts suggest that the
Latin American attitude towards ICSID could be changing again. The
most critical examples of recent hostility against LCSID in Latin America
are found in the cases of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. In fact, in
2007 Bolivia became the first country ever to denounce the Washington
Convention, thus formally withdrawing from ICSID.7 Ecuador followed
Bolivia's path and became the second country to denounce the Washington Convention, 8 and the Venezuelan Supreme Court issued an opinion
limiting the reach of the country's consent to submit to the Centre's
jurisdiction. 9

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

9.

OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Inv., (3d ed., 1996), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/16/2090148.pdf (foreign direct investment refers
to "direct control of either assets or an enterprise in a foreign country through
ownership of a substantial portion of the assets or enterprise.").
See Zachary Elkins, et al., Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Inv.
Treaties, 2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 265, 277 (2008).
See generally M. SORNARAJAH-, THE PURSUITr oi- NAT IONAL IZED) PROPE1RTY Chap.
2, Vol. 8. (1986).
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Inv. Instrument Online-Bilateral Inv. Treaties, http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch779.aspx
(last visited May 15, 2010).
See Elkins et al., supra note 3, at 266 (once sent, these signals transform into "credible commitments").
See Venezuela and Bolivia Threaten to Leave ICSID, LATFIN LAWYiER ONL INE, May
3, 2007, http://www.latinlawyer.com/news/article/24086/venezuela-bolivia-threatenleave-icsid/.
Joshua M. Robbins, Ecuador Withdraws from ICSID Convention, PRAUCiE LAW
COMPANY, Aug. 12, 2009, http://arbitration.practicallaw.com/2-422-1266 (Ecuador
formally notified the World Bank of its decision to withdraw from ICSID on July
6, 2009; in accordance with the Article 71 of the Convention, the denunciation
took effect six months after the receipt of Ecuador's notice on January 7, 2010.
Similarly, since 2009 Ecuador has denounced the vast majority of its BITs).
Another important example, albeit omitted in this paper, of the difficult interaction between the ICSID system and the Latin American region is Argentina. Argentina's approach towards ICSID has changed back and forth in the past decade;
currently, it is still unclear whether the country would be willing to honor and
enforce an ICSID arbitral award. Conversely, recent positive examples in the
Latin American region are found in Haiti, which notified ICSID of its ratification
of the Washington Convention (a.k.a., deposit) on October 27, 2009, and Colombia, which entered into a BIT with India on January, 2009.
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The purpose of this article is to research the historical interaction of
ICSJD and Latin America in an effort to suggest that these "opt-out"
countries may not be a mere aberrational phenomenon in the region subject to surface dismissal. For this reason. Section one of this paper explores the roots of the initial Latin American rejection and subsequent
acceptance of the ICSID as an effective protection for foreign investors.
The first part of the section provides a brief summary of the Centre's
jurisdictional requirements with a special emphasis on the doctrinal issue
of consent and the BITS as a form of expressing consent in advance.
Section two of this paper analyzes the general growing hostility against
ICSID in the region. The first part of this section summarizes the origins
and history of the ICSID, analyzes how Latin American countries initially
approached the ICSID initiative, and explores the rise of the ICSID in
the region during the 1990s. The second part of this section contains an
analysis of the implications and consequences of Bolivia's withdrawal
from ICSLD, and also discusses the repercussions of Ecuador's exclusion,
its subsequent denunciation, and Venezuela's hostile approach.
Finally, the article concludes by suggesting that the system of protection of FDI in Latin America may be on the eve of a drastic change. If,
moved by the engine of ideology, the rest of Latin America follows the
examples of Bolivia and Ecuador and denounces the Washington Convention in favor of a new "regionalized" forum to resolve FDI disputes,
the future of the ICSID in Latin America will become uncertain.
11.

ICSID AND LATIN AMERICA: FROM SOUR TO SWEET...
A.

LCSID

CLAIMS

&

ARBITRATION WITHOUT PRIVITY

ICSLD is an autonomous institution established by the Washington
Convention in 1965, under the auspices of the World Bank.' 0 The stated
purpose of this institution is "to provide facilities for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States.""I According to ICSID, the core of the
10. The World Bank, About Us, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
EXTABOLJTUS/0,,pagePK:50004410-piPK:36602-theSitePK:29708,00.htm
(last
visited July 17, 2010) (Notwithstanding its "autonomy" and its own governing
body, the ICSID is still considered an affiliate of the World Bank group. This close
relationship may better appreciated by taking into account: (i) that all of ICSID's
members are also members of the World Bank [indeed, §67 of the Washington
Convention establishes that it may only be adopted by countries members of the
World Bank, or at least, party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice];
(ii) the World's Bank Governor sits ex officio on ICSID's Administrative Council;
and (iii) the ICSID Secretariat's expenses are financed out of the World Bank's
budget, although costs of individual proceedings are borne by the parties involved
as per Chapter VI of the Washington Convention).
11. See int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Art. 1 § 2, Oct.
14, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. 160 [hereinafter Washington Convention]; see also ICSID,
About JCSID, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/AboutICSID-Home.jsp
(last visited July 7, 2010) [hereinafter About ICSJD] (on its webpage, the Centre
states that: "ICSID was created by the Convention as an impartial international
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Washington Convention was to ease the flow of capitals between natioflS' 2 by: (a) removing barriers to "private investment posed by noncommercial [mainly political] risks," and (b) establishing a "specialized
international method" to resolve investment disputes, which did not then
exist, thus maximizing microeconomic conditions for capital-exporting
countries and entrepreneurs and capital-importing nations)13
Once a country signs and ratifies the Washington Convention, it becomes a member of the ICSID. But becoming a member is not enough to
provide foreign investors with sufficient and efficient protection. The
country must act further by actually consenting to the Centre's jurisdiction. This consent may be effectuated in different ways, but the most
important way is known as "arbitration without privity." Professor Jan
Paulsson introduced this term in 1995 to explain a new "world" in international arbitration, which relates to the investor-state system of protection that, in his own words: "is one where the claimant need not have a
contractual relationship with the defendant and where tables could not be
turned: the defendant could not have initiated arbitration, nor is it certain
of being able even to bring a counterclaim." 1 4 In his work, Professor
Paulsson describes different initiatives in the investor-state system of protection arena, in which the investor may resort to arbitration notwithstanding the absence of a prior arbitration agreement. Among these
devices are: national investment protection laws, BITs, the Central
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), and the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).1s

12.

13.
14.
15.

forum providing facilities for the resolution of legal disputes between eligible parties, through conciliation or arbitration procedures. Recourse to the ICSID facilities is always subject to the parties' consent").
See lbironke T. Odumosu, The Antinomnies of the (Continued) Relevance of ICSID
to the Third World, 8 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 345, 359 (2007) (citing Amco v. Indonesia, 23 I.L.M. 351, 369 (1984)) (actually, the main goal was, and still is, to facilitate investment flows with a view to economic development. This position was
further expanded in the case Amco Asia Corp v. Indonesia, "where the [ICSID]
Tribunal cited the ICSID's Convention's preamble with approval and went on to
argue that protecting investments amounts to the protection of the general interest
of development and developing countries").
See About ICSID, supra note 11.
See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, FoIG~cN INV. L. J., Vot.. 10. N. 2
(1995).
North American Free Trade Agreement, Arts. 1138, 1201, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec.
17, 2003 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993); see also Lucy RF--icD, JAN PAUI.SSON, & NIGELI
BLACKABY, Guide to ICSID Arbitration 66 (2004); Bayview Irrigation Dist. v.
United Mex. States, ICSID case No. ARB (AE)(05/1)(2007), available at http://
icsid. worldban k.orgll CS IDlFron tServlet?req uestType=CasesR H&action Va I-Show
Doc&docld=DC653_En&caseld=C246 (under §1201, Chapter 11 of the North
America Free Trade Agreement, which entered into effect in 1994, by Canada, the
United States, and Mexico, an investor from one of these countries may elect to
sue a host country either under the UNCITRAL rules, or under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. However, a condition precedent to select the latter path is
that the investor, or the country where the investment has been made, must be a
member of the Washington Convention; and, as of November 4, 2007 only the
United States had ratified the Convention (Canada, for instance, signed the Convention in 2006, but has not ratified it, and consequently, it has not entered into
force in that country). Another interesting aspect about the procedural framework
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CLAIM

Prior to perfecting a claim [on the merits] before the ICSID, certain
jurisdictional criteria must be met: (i) the investor bringing the claim
must be a national of a State member of the Washington Convention [jurisdiction ratione personae]; (ii) similarly, the investment must have been
made in a Contracting State of the Washington Convention [also jurisdiction ratione personae]; (iii) the dispute must be a legal dispute arising
directly out of an investment, in the terms established by caseload of the
ICSID Tribunals readily available [jurisdiction ratione materiae]; and (iv)
perhaps most importantly, express 'consent' to arbitrate must be given in
writing by both parties.' 6 While it is not the aim of this paper to provide
an extensive exegesis on these jurisdictional elements, it is critical to discuss their contours as a conceptual predicate to the development of this
analysis.
The first two criteria relate to the nationality of the harmed investor
and place of investment;' 7 the former, the nationality-membership requirement includes the exception of cases arising under the additional
facility rules. For instance, in disputes arising under the NAIFTA, the only
cases that can be decided by an ICSJD Tribunal are those involving a
party related to the United States. This would be the case of a claim filed
by U.S. investors against Canada or Mexico; and the case of a claim filed
by Canadian and/or Mexican investors against the U.S. as well. Another
interesting discussion on this topic that has been particularly relevant in
Latin America is the so-called practice of "treaty shopping" and corporate engineering.' 8 These terms refer to a practice common in the field,
of NAFTA arbitration to comment is that the only parties entitled to bring a claim
and assert jurisdiction under NAFTA, are investors from a State party. And, the
term 'investment' has been broadly defined by §1139 of NAFTA, thereby widening
the jurisdictional reach of a NAFTA claim. Similarly, a panel of arbitrators,
headed by Mr. Bernardo Cremades, established in Bayview Irrigation District v.
Mexico, that "in order to determine whether the claims fall within Articles 1115
and 1116 it is therefore necessary to determine whether the Claimants are 'investors', and whether their claims are within the scope and coverage of Chapter 11.").
16. Washington Convention, supra note I], art. 25; see generally, Rri--TAo,
PAUI.SSON, &
Bi ACKABY, supra note 15.
17. See Washington Convention, supra note 11, art. 25(2)(a)-(b) (however, it should be
noted that for purposes of determining the nationality of a juridical person the
Convention introduces the concept of "foreign control." §25(b)(2) of the Convention establishes that National of Another Contracting State means, "any juridical
person which had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State party
[... ]3and any juridical person which had the nationality of the Contracting State
party to the dispute [. ..land which, because of foreign control, the parties have
agreed should be treated as a national of another Contracting State for the purposes of this Convention.)".
18. Aguas del Tunari v. Bol., ICSID Case N.ARB/02/3 (2005); see also Jean Kalicki &
Suzana Medeiros, Investment Arbitration in Brazil: Revisiting Brazil's Traditional
Reluctance Towards ICSID, BITs, and Investor-State Arbitration, 24 ARB. INT'L
423, 482 (2008), available at http://www.arnoldporter.com/professionals.cfm?u=
Jean EngelmayerKal icki&action=view& id=254&viewpage=pu bl ications (these
terms refer to a practice common in the field, where sophisticated attorneys seek
to structure deals by using different corporate forms, with the intention to extend
to investors the protection of a third country BIT, when their own home country
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where sophisticated attorneys seek to structure transactions by using different corporate forms, with the intent to extend to investors the protection of a third country BIT, where their own home country lacks BIT
protection status.
Likewise, the third criterion poses the difficulty of the definition of the
term "investment."'1 9 But there is sufficient precedent 2 0 set by ICSID
awards that sets the grounds to define this term that provides for useful
conceptual guidance. 2 ' For instance, in contractual claims,
[t]ribunals have found 'disputes arising directly out of an investment'
to include disputes over capital contributions and other equity investments in companies and joint ventures, as well as non-equity direct investments via service contracts, transfer of technology, natural
resource concession agreements, and projects for the construction
and operation of production and service facilities in the host State. 2 2
Meanwhile, in non-contractual claims the tribunals have traditionally
applied an even broader definition of "investment," to cover "the laying
out of money or property in business ventures, so that it may produce a
revenue or incom'e." 2 3
Finally the last criterion, the consent, as seen above, is deemed to be
fundamental for the assertion of the jurisdiction of ICSID. Consent is
"the explicit expression of both parties' acceptance of ICSID arbitration."124 According to §25 of the Convention, the consent must be given
does not have one protecting their investment. In Aguas

19.

20.
21.
22.
23.

24.

del Tunari, ICSID Case

N.ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent's Objections to Jurisdiction (2005), an ICSID Tribunal found that national routing was a valid and legitimate exercise of the
Corporation that changed its ownership structure, in order to be able to claim
jurisdiction under the Bolivia-Netherlands BIT. However, Kalicki notes that such
a practice is now being taken care of by recent developments in BIT drafting, in
which "Contracting States include a provision allowing a party to deny the benefits
of the agreement to investors that have no 'substantial business activities' in their
putative home country)."
REEDo, PAUL-SSON, & BLACKABY, supra note 15 (regarding the meaning of the
phrase "legal dispute" in contractual investment disputes Reed, Paulsson & Blackaby held that "ICSID Tribunals have generally used the phrase to refer either to
disputes regarding the existence or scope of a legal right or obligation, or to disputes regarding the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of
a legal obligation." A classical example of this would be an expropriation of FDI
made without just compensation, or a denial to honor payments of promissory
notes (bonds)).
Notably, in the international arena, such as in the majority of Civil Law jurisdictions, judicial "precedent" is distinguishable from "stare decisis" in the sense that
it does not refer to any binding authority of judicial/arbitral decisions or awards.
See Autopista Concesionariade Venez. v. Venez., ICSID Case No.ARB/00/5 (2001)
(Decision on Jurisdiction); Mihaly Int'l v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARBIO0/2,
Award (2002).
See REED-i, PAULSSON, & BLACKABY, supra note 15.
Id. (citing Fedax v. Venez., ICSID Case No.ARB9613 (1997) (finding that the issuance of bonds/promissory notes by Venezuela, and the subsequent acquisition of
them in the secondary markets by a Netherlands investor, constituted an investment in the territory under the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT).
Id at 22, 38; see also Jason Webb Yackee, Do We Really Need BITs? Toward a
Return to Contract International Investment Law, 3 ASIAN J. WTO INIr'i- HEALTHI
L.& PoL'Y 121 (2008) (arguing investment contracts are more convenient than
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in written format. 2 5 The investor normally expresses his consent to arbitrate disputes under a particular investment by submitting it to the Centre
along with his request for arbitration, in accordance with §36(2) of the
Convention. 2 6 On the other hand, even though states may also do this,
expressing thereby their consent on a case-by-case basis, they normally
give their anticipated consent through BITs and investment protection
laws.
Moreover, the importance of consent was underlined on the famous
Report of the Executive Directors of the World Bank on the ICSJD Convention, prepared in 1965 at the origins of the Centre. 2 7 They referred to
consent of the parties as being "the cornerstone of the jurisdiction of the
Centre."12 8 Similarly, in relation to consent, the Directors stated that consent must exist prior to a request for arbitration or a request for conciliation. Some of the forms of consent permitted to satisfy the requirements
of §25(1) are: (i) a clause included in an investment agreement providing
for the submission to the Centre of future disputes arising out of that
agreement; (ii) a compromise regarding a dispute which has already
arisen; or (iii) a provision in the host state's investment promotion legislation offering to submit disputes arising out of certain classes of investments to the jurisdiction of the Centre, which would still require the
investor's acceptance in writing. 2 9 The great academic discussion in this
field arises from the third form of consent; specifically from the BITs,
which once in force could be considered part of the country's internal
legislation. 3 0
A parallel classification of the form of consent permitted is based on
the source of the consent, whether contractual or not. Sometimes investors and states enter into 'investment contracts,' including an arbitration
clause that grants jurisdiction to the Centre. 3 ' Conversely, in the vast
majority of the cases, the states, in racing to get foreign capital, have consented in advance to the ICSID jurisdiction by including an arbitration

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

BITs for the International business Community, because with these contracts developing countries may provide investors with credible commitments, and at the
same time they would be able to bargain for a suitable special treatment).
Washington Convention, supra note 11.
Washington Cunventiun, supra note 11, art. 36(2).
Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Report of the Executive Directors of the
World Bank on the ICSID Convention Ch. V, $ 23 (1965), available at http://icsid.worldbank.orgICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/partB.htm.
See id.
Id. at $ 24.

30. See generally CHRISTroPHER C. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN n-uqE 2ls'r CEN-ruRY: RULES FOR GLO01AL GOVERNANCE (2005) (in fact, this would depend in
whether the particular country adopts a Monistic or a Dualistic theory of International Law. The former refers to countries that assume International law and their

municipal law as a unity equally applicable. While the latter refers to countries
that highlights the differentiation between domestic and International law, and require the conversion of International law into domestic laws, through the enactment of internal laws).
31. See Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Model Clauses, http://icsid.world
bank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/model-clauses-en/main-eng.htm (for a comprehensive
list of model clauses on the Centre's webpage).
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clause in BITs or multilateral investment treaties ("MITs") entered with
other nations, 3 2 or even by including the sovereign's consent to arbitration in foreign investment legislation. As explained in this section, the
latter would constitute cases of arbitration without privity.
C.

WHY COUNTRIES ENTERED INTO

BITs

A BIT is an agreement entered into by two nations with the purpose of
stimulating the investment and trade between both nations by offering a
framework of protections available to investors. Usually, the process of
entering into a BIT makes sense when there is a prospect that the commercial relations among one state (a capital-importer State) and the nationals of the other state (capital-exporter) may improve. 3 3
In part, this assertion may explain why the vast majority of the BITs
bear a similar structure. According to one author, most BITs mimic two
unsuccessful attempts to create a uniform approach to FDI in the international community, i.e., the 1959 Abs-Shawcross Convention, and the 1967
OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property.3 4 The
structure of a typical BIT is formed by a set of substantive protections
that states offer to investors and by a clause granting jurisdiction to foreign tribunals to solve the claims that may arise under the treaty (whether
considered to be consent, or a mere unilateral offer to consent) 35 The
substantive protections usually contained in BITs are: (i) fair and equitable treatment; (ii) nondiscriminatory treatment; (iii) non-arbitrary or unreasonable treatment; (iv) full protection and security treatment; (v)
treatment as favorable as that provided to national investors; (vi) ability
to repatriate proceeds of the investment to home country; (vii) no expropriation without compensation; and (viii) the host country will honour its
contractual and other legal obligations owed to the foreign investor
(a.k.a., the umbrella clause). 3 6
32. United States Model BIT Clause (2004), art. 24, available at http://ustraderep.govassets/TradeSectors/Investment/Model BIT/asset-upload-file847_6897.pdf (for
instance, §24 of the U.S. Model BIT clause grants jurisdiction, though not exclusive, to the ICSID).
33. See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explainingthe
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 644 (1998) (Professor Guzman explains the BIT explosion by inferring that the confidence that
investors felt that their investments will not be opportunistically expropriated by
the host State, was caused by the fact that BITs "allow potential investors to negotiate for whatever protections and safeguard they feel are needed. In other words,
BITs provide the investors with protections that are superior, in all forms of investor-host conflicts, to those of customary international law.").
34. See Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Studies of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 33 BROOK. J. IN-i-'i- L. 405, 415 (2008).
35. Perhaps this fact explains why the drafters of ICSID Rules devised a scheme of
proceedings that are often bifurcated into separate phases to address the merits
and the jurisdiction.
36. See Arif Hyder Ali & Alexandre Gramont, ICSID Arbitration in the Americas,
GLOB1AL- ARn. RF~V Am., 2008, at 7, available at http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/handbooks/4/sections/7/chapters/50/icsid-arbitration-americas.
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What we witnessed during the 1990s was an explosion of LDCs, in particular Latin American countries, embracing the Washington Convention,
entering into hundreds of BITs, and also modifying their foreign investment legislation. We also experienced a plethora of claims against Latin
American countries before this forum. When the trend commenced,
BITs became "the preferred method of governing the relationship between foreign investors and host governments in developing countries."13 7
Professors Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons provide interesting and de-

tailed data about the advent and spread of

BITs. 38

They hold that com-

petition among similarly situated countries explain, both theoretically and

empirically, the spread of the

BITs. 39

They also found an empirical basis

for the assertion that the most important drivers of the spread of BIT's are
also factors that heavily impacts investment decisions ."0 For instance,
they found that BITs are more valuable where political risk is endemic."'
For these reasons, in order to attract capital, Latin American countries
in the 1990s needed to enter into these treaties, or modify their internal
legislation, waiving part of their immunity by agreeing beforehand to the
jurisdiction of a third party,"2 in most cases, the ICSID. With this system
of protection, investors sought to effectively de-politicize investments disputes." 3 Indeed, they would be able to mitigate political risks normally
associated with the functioning of business in Latin America by removing
these disputes from the internal (and sometimes compromised) judiciaries, as well as "traditional diplomatic channels" by directly submitting
them to arbitration.""4

D.

THE NO-DE-TOKYO

The ICSID Convention was not initially adopted by any of the Latin
American countries. In fact, when the Convention was first discussed in
different regional meetings of the World Bank' 45 Latin American counSee Guzman, supra note 33, at 642.
See ELKINS FT AL., supra note 3, at 291-98.
Id. at 207.
Id
Id
Guzman, supra note 33, at 688 (Professor Guzman criticizes the way LDCs massively entered into BITs. In his conclusions he states that "Although BIT's improve the efficiency of foreign investment, they may not increase the welfare of
developing countries. BITs give an individual country the ability to make credible
promises to potential foreign investors. As a result, the country is more attractive
to foreign investors and will receive a larger volume of investment than it would
without the ability to make such promises. The increase in investment, however, is
likely to come in large part at the expense of other developing countries. Developing countries as a group, therefore, will enjoy gains from an increase in total investment that is relatively modest. It is probable that this gain will be outweighed by the
loss those countries will suffer as they bid against one another to attract investment.") (emphasis added).
43. See generally II3RAIIIm F.I. S111HATA, TOWARDS A GREA-TE DEP1OT ICIZATION
OF INVESTMEN-r Disi~u-rms: THlE ROi ES OF ICSID AND MIGA (1993).
44. See Kalicki & Medeiros, supra note 18, at 58.
45. These regional meetings took place in Ethiopia, Chile, Switzerland, and Thailand.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
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tries, in bloc, opposed the idea of establishing a specialized forum for
governments and foreign investors. 46 Professor Lowenfeld (along with
other scholars) called this posture of Latin American countries to the
Convention a "No-de-Tokyo." 47 This posture could probably have been
precipitated by a misunderstanding of the Latin American nations who
never considered that the Convention, as explained above, "contained no
substantive obligations, but merely an opportunity to submit in advance
(or after a dispute has arisen) to international dispute settlement between
an investor and a host state." 48 If no further consent (either contractually
or not) was granted, it was impossible for a state to be subjected to ICSID's Jurisdiction.
Furthermore, back in 1971 Professor Paul Szasz, a former Secretary
General of the ICSID, identified the main reasons why Latin American
countries had yet to adhere to the Convention. 49 First, Professor Szasz
recognized that "not all governments [were] uniformly eager to attract"
FDI.5 0 Second, Latin American countries feared that by adopting the
Convention they would be undermining the well-established principle of
international law of no-intervention. 5 1 Third, by allowing only "foreign"
46. See Paul C. Szasz, The Investment Disputes Convention and Latin America, 11 VA.
J. INT'l L.256, 257 (1971).
47. See ANDREAS F. LoWENFELD, INT'L ECONOMIC LAw 541 (2d ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 2008) (according to Professor Lowenfeld, "when the report of the regional
meetings on the proposed [ICSID] convention came before the Board of Governors of the World Bank (i.e., the full membership), at the Annual Meeting of the
Bank in Tokyo in 1964, all Latin American States voted 'no'-the first time in the
Bank's history that a final resolution had met with substantial opposition on a final
vote.").
48. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Inv. Agreements and Int'l Law, 42 CoLum. J. TRANSNAT'L

L. 123, 125 (2003) (citing Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes, 136 RECUEIL DEs COURs 331, 349 (1972)); Aron Broches,
The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 136 REculIL DES
Coui~s 331, 349 (1972), available at http://www.ppl.nl/plinklet/?sid=Bibliographies
&ppn=250600919&genre=article&issn=&isbn=&title=The%20Convention%20on
%20the%20Settlement%20of%201nvestment%20Disputes%20between%20
States%20and%20Nationals%20of%200ther%20States%20/%20by%2OAron%
20Broches&aulast=Broches&aufirst=Aron&au2last=&au2first
=&au3last=&
au3first=&edlast=&edfirst=&ed2ast=&ed2first=&ed3ast=ed3ast&ed3first=&
source=recueil%20des%20cours&year=1972&volume=136&issue=lI&spage=33141 0&bibliography=recueil&table=recueil&download=&scharnier=&extensie=&id
=344&url=&keywordl=&keywordlppn=&brillid=19824.
49. Szasz, supra note 46, at 260.
50. Id. at 260 (Professor Szasz remarked that "Whether such reluctance is based on a
general anti-capitalist,or on a suspicion or fear of any foreign penetration, or
merely on unfortunate experiences with particular foreign investors, it is enough to
say that such a reaction by its nature cannot be refuted in relation to the Convention. That instrument assumes that private internationalinvestment plays a significant role in internationalcooperationfor economic development [as stated in the
first paragraph of the Preamble of the Convention].") (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 260; see also CARLOS CALVO, DEREC10 INTERNACIONAL TEORICO Y PRACTWO D EUROPA v AMIRICA, 191 (1st ed. Durand & Pedone-Lauriel 1868); Wil-

liam Burke-White & Andreas Von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary
Times, 48 VA. I. INT L. 307, 310 (2008) (Szasz's second and third identified reasons are extremely related to the Calvo Doctrine. This doctrine establishes that
jurisdiction in cases arising out from foreign investment in a country falls in the
country, providing that foreigners may not be given a different treatment than the
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investors (as opposed to nationals) to arbitrate their disputes against host
states, they were breaching the well-established principle of international
law regarding equal treatment of foreigners and nationals . 52 Fourth, the
Latin American countries rejected the argument that their domestic
courts were not ideal (in terms of efficiency and fairness) fora to try these
claims . 53 Last, Latin American countries were suspicious of arbitral proceedings as opposed to judicial proceedings, primarily because of the
"past association with foreign intervention, of arbitration and a private

person."15 4

Meanwhile, FDI was not left unprotected in Latin America. Investors
and nations bargained for tailored solutions in order to limit the exposure
of the former to political risks. The result of these contractual solutions
was the "internationalization" of investment contracts 5 5 by systematically
including in these contracts sophisticated arbitration, choice-of-law, and

stabilization clauses .5 6

E.

GRADUAL ACCEPTANCE

57

A few decades after the birth of the Convention, the Latin American
countries modified their approach to it and gradually decided to embrace
it. In the 1980s the first Latin American countries to join the Convention
were Ecuador, Honduras, and El Salvador. In the 1990s the rest of the
Latin American countries, with the exceptions of Mexico and Brazil,
joined the Convention. 5 8

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

57.
58.

one given to nationals. Initially this doctrine was created as a legal answer of the
Latin American Nations to insulate themselves from pressure and attacks of foreign countries on behalf of forcign investors. However, several decades later this
doctrine was revitalized in the context of an international effort to protect foreign
investment. According to a recent paper in the subject: "for investors in Latin
America, the possibility of direct arbitration against a government represented a
significant change from the Calvo Doctrine, according to which a government's
liability toward foreigners can be no greater than that owed to nationals. As a
result, disputes between foreigners and a host country could only be decided by
the country's own legal system.").
Szasz, supra note 46, at 261 (The same comments made on footnote 15 apply here).
Id. at 262.
Id. at 263.
See M. SORNARAJAJI, supra note 4 (for a lengthy discussion of the internationalization of investment contracts).
Id. at 80 (it shall be noted that the theory of internationalization of investment
contracts also presented some difficulty at its early stages, especially given the fact
there was no body of laws governing a relationship in which one of the parties was
not subject to International law. However, the adoption of the Restrictive Theory
of Sovereign Immunity by the American legal system, favored the trend of Internationalizing Investment Contracts. This legal phenomenon began with the famous Tate letter, see 26 Drr'Tr OF STATE- Buil., 984 (1952), which was later
codified in 1976 in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§1602-1611,
28 U.S.C. §330. For a marvelous explanation about the absolute and restrictive
theories of sovereign immunity see PEDRO MARTINEz-FRAGA, THE Ni _w ROL-E OF
COMITY IN PRIVATE PROCEDURAL INTFERNATIONAL LAW, 164 et seq. (2007).
Lowenfeld, supra note 48, at 121.
Charity L. Goodman, Uncharted Waters: FinancialCrisis and Enforcement of ICSID Awards in Argentina, 28 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 450, 471 (2007).
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Along with this significant adoption of the Convention, in the 1990s
several Latin American States modified their internal legislation, and/or
entered into numerous Bilateral Investment Treaties.5 9 This "modification" completed the required consent (as explained above) in several
cases, bringing to the ICSID an unprecedented number of claims. For
instance, as of 2007, fifteen percent of the concluded matters concerned
claims against Latin American States.6 0 As of the present, fifty-two percent 61 of the pending matters at the ICSID involve Latin American
States. 62 For this reason, one could argue that the booming of ICSID in
Latin America in the 90's, preceded by the so-called "No-de-Tokyo," contributed to the ICSID, and the investor-State system of protection in general, earning the cognomen of "sleeping beauty." 63
This gradual acceptance of the Latin American region to the ICSID
system of protection could be explained by the theory of credible commitments. In support of this theory Professor Vanvelde analyzed the results of different studies on the correlation between FDI and the number
of BITs signed by a particular LDC, to conclude that:
While large arbitral awards against host states could dampen the enthusiasm of host states, . . . for these agreements, they might also

signal to investors the value of the agreements and lead to increased
investment flows ... Any enhanced investment flows as a result of the
investment agreements are likely to be in the direction of developing
countries. Thus, concerns by developing countries about the issuance
of large arbitral awards could be more than offset by the belief that
investment agreements had contributed to increased investment
flows. 64 (emphasis added).
The problem with this statement is found in its ideological component.
In other words, if it can be demonstrated that the investment commerce
has grown, investment agreements must have caused such incremental
development. This recourse would be the only way that a country may be
59. Stanimir Alexandrov et al., Making Investment Treaties Work for Latin America,
ARB. REV. OF THF AM. 4 (2009), available at http://www.globalarbitrationreview.

com/reviews/i 3/sections/50/chapters/497/making-investment-treaties-work-latinamerica/.

60. See Jean Kalicki, ICSID Arbitration in the Americas, AR.

REV. OF TIE AM. 5

(2007), available at http://www.arnoldporter.com/professionals.cfm?u=JeanEnge
lmayerKalicki&action=view&id=254&viewpage=publications.
61. This number excludes the four claims pending against Mexico, under the Additional Facility Rules. Otherwise, the percentage would rise up to fifty-five percent.
62. Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, List of Pending Cases, http://icsid.worldbank.org/lCSIDIFrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal
=ListPending (last visited July 7, 2010) (computation made with numbers provided
by ICSID).
63. See

NORBERr HORN AND) STPAN

KROuL, ARBITRATING FOREIGN

INVESTMENT

Dispurns, 269 (2004) (According to Professor Norbert Horn, "the ICSID regime
has been referred as the 'sleeping beauty' of investment arbitration, as in its early
years only one or two cases were filed annually" [in fact, during the first six years
of ICSID no case was filed], while now two or three cases are filed monthly).
64. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT't L. & Po'Y 157 (2005).
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willing to offset the costs of large ICSID awards. Otherwise, if the credible commitments in favor of foreign investment (BITs, MITs and. Investment Protection Laws granting Jurisdiction to ICSID) have not attracted
significant investment to the host country, there would be no incentive
for capital-importing nations to continue to assume these economic
burdens.
III.

ICSID AND LATIN AMERICA: FROM SWiEET TO SOUR
A.

GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE GROWING RESISTANCE

Along with the strong supporters of ICSID and the investor-state System of protection, there is also a growing number of detractors and criticism. While some of the critiques seem to have more scientific grounds, 6 5
others appear to contain an ideological component.66 Because BITS and
the investor-State system of protection pertains to a flow of capital from
capital-exporters countries to capital-importers countries, it is possible to
measure whether these efforts have succeeded in bringing wealth into a
particular country within a specific period of time.
Although this article does not purport to draw conclusions on whether
BITS and the investor-state system of protection have succeeded in each
particular country of the region, it does analyze how different Latin
American countries have recently reacted to the system. Today, the
warm welcome to the ICSID system has largely disappeared and the relationship between the ICSID and Latin America has soured.
On April 29, 2007 in Caracas the Presidents of Bolivia, Venezuela,
Cuba, and Nicaragua held the V Summit of the Bolivarian Alternative for
the People of Our America ("ALBA"), which is an alternative agreement
from these countries in bloc to the investor-state system of protection
65. For instance, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development conducted a study about BITs entered by LDCs with developed nations in the 1990s
to conclude that BITs played a secondary and minor role in attracting foreign investment. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Bilateral
Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s, at 8, 177, U.N. Sales No. E.98.1I.13.8 (1998).
In another study, a World Bank conomist found that BITs 'act morc complements than as substitutes for good institutional quality and local property rights.
See Mary H-allward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct Investment? Only a BIT.. and They Could Bite, World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper No. 3121 (2003), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=
636541. However, in a more recent study, Salacuse and Sullivan conducted their
own study, and reviewed both of these research studies, to conclude in the opposite direction, stating that "BITs have a particularly strong effect on encouraging
FDI in developing countries. In short, the grand bargain between developing and
developed countries that underlies BITs, the bargain of investment promotion in
return for investment protection, seems to have been achieved, although the effect
of the bargain is only realized slowly after the BIT is signed." See Jeswald W.
Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs really work? An Evaluation of Bilateral
Investment Treaties and their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. l~'.L.J. 67, Ill (2005).
66. See generally Odumosu, supra note 12, at 345 (arguing that ICSID is a Neo-liberal
investment protection mechanism, and that its origins are routed to the interests of
TNCs in third-world countries).
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encompassing the different BITs and MITs. 6 7 At this meeting Presidents
Morales and Chavez announced that the four countries in conjunction
would withdraw from the ICSID and denounce all the BITs in force.6 8
Consequently, on May 11, 2008, Ecuador's President Rafael Correa publicly stated that he "had no confidence in the World Bank arbitration
branch [i.e., ICSID] that is hearing U.S. oil company Occidental's lawsuit
against Ecuador."16 9 He also explained that "Ecuador handed over its
sovereignty when it signed international accords binding it to the bank's
70
ICSID."1
These announcements have echoed some of the strongest criticism to
the investor-state system of protection. Nonetheless, they can also be explained by the recent wave of nationalizations and expropriations of FDI
undertaken in the region, which in most cases bears an ideological explanation. 7 1 The arguments against the ICSID and the investor-state system
of protection that Latin American governments advanced are focused on
the following reasons:7 2 (i) ICSID awards are not subject to appeal; 73 (ii)
the fact that a vast majority of ICSID awards have been decided in favor
67. See Press Release, Presidential Press Notice, Paises del ALBA y TCP Denuncian
Convencidn del Ciadi (Apr. 29, 2007), available at http://www.minci.gob.ve/noticias
..-.. prensa/28/13558/paises -del-alba.html (however, please note that even when the
announcement did not make any distinctions about a potential withdrawal of Cuba
from the ICSID Convention, this is an absurdity, since Cuba has never been a
Contracting State of the Convention).
68. Id. (Bolivia was the first country to denounce the Convention withdrawing from
ICSID. In fact, it was unclear whether other countries would ever follow its path.
However, Ecuador decided to withdraw as well); see Posting of Tolga Yalkin to
Blog of the European Journal of International Law, July 30, 2009, http://www.
ejiltalk.org/ecuador-denounces-icsid-much-ado-about-nothing.
69. See Gabriela Molina, Ecuador Wary of World Bank Arbitration in Occidental Case,
USA ToDAY, May 11, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-0511-3404362337_x.htm.
70. Id.
71. Id. (for instance, on May Day, 2007, when President Chavez announced the expropriation of the private participation in the four major heavy crude oil upgraders
located in the Orinoco Oil Belt, he justified his decision by stating "We can't have
socialism if the state doesn't have control over its resources!"); see Tim Padgett,
Chavez's Not-So-Radical Oil Move, TIME, May 1, 2007, http://www.time.com/time/
world/article/0,8599,1616644,00.html. (however, on many other occasions President
Chavez and his closest advisors have indicated that expropriations and de-privatizations are an essential part of his plan of taking Venezuela towards socialism. In
his view FDI represents the interest of imperialism, and strengthens capitalism);
see Expropiaci6n de Empresas estd Sujeta al Compromiso Social, BOLIVARIAN
Nu~ws AGENCY, Mar. 22, 2007, http://www.aporrea.org/ideologia/n92267.html (former member of Chavez Cabinet explaining that companies reluctant to embrace
the Socialism of the XXI Century would be expropriated).
72. See Bolivia se va del CIA DI, The World Bank, Nov. 3, 2007, http://go.worldbank.
orgI2L6OlIOX8O (these reasons are enumerated in the World Bank press release
(in Spanish) announcing Bolivia's exit to ICSID).
73. See REErD ET AL, supra note 15 (even though it is technically true that ICSID
awards are not subject to appeal, the Washington Convention provides grounds for
the interpretation (§50), revision (§51), and annulment of the award (§52). An
award may not be amended through annulment. Annulment would erase the
award entirely, thereby providing the parties with a chance to re-instate the claim.
However, the annulment system is designed to safeguard the integrity and not the
outcome of the award).
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of the private investors shows that the system lacks neutrality and impar-

tiality; 74 (Ili) only private companies may sue at this forum; and (iv) the
cost to litigate these claims is very high. 7 5

These announcements are not galvanized by scientific or statistical data
but by ideology. In other words, they are driven by a personal conviction
that FDI, even if it does foster development and prosperity, is wrong,
promotes imperialism, and thus deserves no effective protection. In this
sense, an effective system of protection of FDI, such as ICSID, could be
seen as an undue waiver of sovereignty. If this presumption proves to be
true, it would be very hard, if not impossible, to predict what will be the
future of ICSID in the region.
Argentina's case-study is also critical. Indeed, Argentina's still uncertain willingness to honor eventual final and binding ICSID awards will be
determinative to ICSID's authority in the region.7 6 After the Argentine
financial crisis between 2001 and 2002,77 dozens of claims were filed by
74. Although it is true, at least in theory, that in the majority of the ICSID cases (fiftyone percent) the tribunals have found for the investors, in practice a number of
cases have significantly reduced the amounts of compensation sought by the investors. For instance, in Autopista Concesionariade Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/00/
5 (2003), the tribunal awarded the investors with the equivalent in lBolivars of $12
million, when they were seeking relief for almost the equivalent of $311 million.
75. The rationale of this argument is that given that prior consent is critical, and that in
many cases, once a dispute has arisen, an investor is entitle to sue in ICSID due to
the existence of a previous unilateral offer to consent to arbitration by the State
(e.g., a BIT); but the converse would not be true, because once a dispute arises, if
the State is seeking to sue the investor, it would be impossible to obtain its consent
to arbitrate. However, this argument may be underestimating the bargaining
power of the country, even when the dispute has arisen. Although §36 technically
entitles a country to initiate an arbitration against a foreign investor, the only case
in which a government might sue an investor under the Washington Convention,
would be a case in which it contracted directly with the investor. This is what
happened in Tanz. Electric Supply v. Indep. Power Tanz., Ltd, ICSID Case No.
ARB19818 (2001) (the award was published on ICSID's website). Presumably this
was also the case in Gov t of the Province of East Kalimantan v. PT Kaltim Prima
Coal, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/3, because notwithstanding there is little information publicly available about this case, one may infer from the fact that both parties are related to Indonesia (in fact, East Kalimantan is an Indonesian Province),
that the basis of ICSID jurisdiction was also an investment agreement with an
explicit arbitration clause granting jurisdiction to the Centre. Similarly, it is repurted that years agu Nicaragua initiated an ICSID claim against an investor, but
later withdrew the proceedings. No other case has ever been started by a country.
76. Even though Argentina has not paid the amount ordered in the final and binding
decision (after annulment proceedings) of Enron Corp. & PonderosaAssets, L.P.
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, it is still uncertain whether the
country has decided not to honor voluntarily pay the amounts. Yet, since no enforcement proceeding has been started before neither domestic nor international,
one may presume that the country and the company could be currently negotiating
a peaceful solution.
77. See generally, PAUL BLUSTEIN, ANcD THE MONEY KEP-r Rol-LING IN ANI-) OU-r,

(2006) (the master of Argentina's liberalization and opening to free-markets in the
1990's was Domingo Cavalho, President Menem's Economy Minister. In 1991
Cavalho implemented a currency convertibility system, which fixed the Argentine
Peso to the U.S. Dollar. This measure, along with many others, such as privatizations and liberalizations of interest rates, were successful in halting the hyper-inflation experienced in the 1980s, and boosting the economy. However, after a few
years, and given the growing budget deficit the convertibility measure became a
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foreign investors against Argentina. Needless to say these events caused
Argentina the dubious distinction of breaking all records as the country
with more claims filed in ICSID,7 8 and potentially subject to the largest

monetary awards entered against

it7

As a result of this trend, Argentina raised two defenses in most of the
cases: the applicability of non-preclusive measures clause (NPM) contained in the BIT to object to such disputes; and the state-of-necessity as
a doctrine of customary international law. 80 So far only two arbitral
panels have dismissed the claims on the basis of the "necessity defense."18 1
In response to the cases in which the arbitral tribunals have found for the
investors, Argentina has started annulment proceedings under §52 of the
Convention, along with a request for stay of enforcement, 8 2 which has
been granted by the respective ad hoc annulment committees in virtually
all cases. 83 If these annulment proceedings end with results similar to the

78.

79.
80.
81.
82.

83.

sort of general subsidy which emptied the country's foreign currency reserves. For
some time a chain of loans granted by multilateral institutions (principally the International Monetary Fund) provided the hard currency needed, but the country
entered into an unprecedented crisis after the IMF refused to grant a $1.7billion
loan, which was essential to serve the country's debt, and to maintain the levels of
liquidity available to the banking sector stable); see DOMINGO CAVALLO, TimE
FICHT'ro Avoico DEFAIUT ANI) DF~VALUATION (2002), http://www.cavallo.com.ar/
wp-con ten t/uploadslthe-fight. pdf . (When the financial institutions tumbled,
Cavalho-who was brought back in 2001 to the Ministry of the Economy, on an
emergency basis, after his predecessor Lopez Murphy was fired eight days after
being appointed-eliminated the convertibility (drastically reducing the people's
savings to a third of the original value) and imposed a restriction on withdrawals to
the general public (the so-called corralito). This caused a sociopolitical turmoil in
the country, which ended in the ousting of four Presidents in three weeks).
See Ali & Gramont, supra note 36 (approximately forty percent of all of the cases
registered so far at ICSID have been against governments in the Americas. A very
high number of those cases have been brought against Argentina (there are currently over thirty cases pending against Argentina at ICSID, in addition to a dozen
or so cases previously filed against Argentina that have since been resolved). Most
of the Argentine cases arose out of Argentina's economic crisis in 2001 -2002, its
resulting currency devaluation and the policies adopted by the government in response to the crisis. But even if one discounted the Argentine cases entirely, a
quarter of the cases at ICSID would still be against governments in the Americas).
See Paolo Di Rosa, The Recent Wave of Arbitrations against Argentina under Bilateral Investment Treaties: Background and Principal Issues, 36 U. MIAMI INTERAm. L. RE--V. 41, 73 (2004) (the explosion of cases against Argentina in the aftermath of the 2001 financial crisis was announced by Paolo Di Rosa in 2004).
See William W. Burke-White, The Argentine FinancialCrisis: State Liability Under
BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System, 3 AsIAN J. OF n EWTO & INT'L
HE-Auni L. AND PoL'v 199, 202 (2008).
Id. at 205.
LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1 (2007)
(award on the merits July 25, 2008); and Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine
Republic, No. ARB/03/9 (2008) (award on the merits rendered Sept. 5, 2008).
See Harout Samra, Five Years Later: The CMS Award Placed in the Context of the
Argentine FinancialCrisis and the ICSID Arbitration Boom, 38 U. MIAMI lrrrI7RAm. L. RE V. 667, 693 (2008) (this has been called by an author in a scholarly paper
on the topic as "an effort to prolong the final resolution").
However, once the annulment proceedings end the stay for enforcement is lifted
and, under §54 of the Convention the award becomes binding (as if it were rendered by a national court of the contracting state). In September 2008, Argentina's Attorney General, in relation to the case Enron Corp., ICSID Case no. Arbl

2010] UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF ICSJD IN LATIN AMERICA

425

CMS case,84 Argentina will end up facing the question of whether to
honor its ICSID obligations. The specific issue will become whether Argentine courts are willing to enforce an award against their government. 8 5
A negative decision seems to be detrimental to both Argentina and the
ICSID system in general. But a decision from Argentina to honor the
entire amount potentially owed to prevailing claimants seems financially
unfeasible in the near future.
IV.

CASE STUDY: BOLIVIA, ECUADOR & VENEZUELA
A.

BOLIVIA's FORMAL WITHDRAWAL FROM
86
THE END OF A RELATIONSHIP 1

JCSID:

On May 2, 2007 Bolivia formally notified the ICSID Secretariat of its
formal withdrawal from the Centre and the Washington Convention. 87
This pronouncement raised a series of legal issues. At the core of the
judicial discussion of Bolivia's withdrawal and its consequences, there is
an underlying discussion about the reach of consent on ICSID claims.
Even where the arguments may turn out to be highly scholastic, the po01/3, stated that an ICSID award may not be enforceable prior recognition or vali-

84.
85.

86.
87.

dation of internal courts. A month later the ad hoc annulment committee of the
case deciding a motion to lift the stay, gave Argentina a sixty-day period to reconsider its position about the "extent of its obligation to pay on the final award."
See Samra, supra note 82, at 693.
The question of enforceability of ICSID awards has been treated in different ICSID awards, and by several commentators. For instance, §54(1) establishes that
member States shall recognize and enforce ICSID awards as if they were final
judgments of a court in that State of the Convention. Likewise, in Maritime International Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Republic of Guinea, Case No. ARB/
84/4, Ad Hoc (1990), the Committee stated that the "ICSID Convention the ICSID Convention excludes any attack on the award in the national courts." But, the
reality is different when dealing with sovereign nations. If a country arbitrarily
decides not to enforce an adverse award a party may not do much, provided that
such country does not have assets abroad. Some authors have argue that in such
cases investors will be entitle to complain before the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and to trigger diplomatic protections, such as requesting
their home State to start a claim on their behalf before the International Court of
Justice. See Edward Baldwin et al., Limits to Enforcement of ICSID Awards, 23 J.
0" INT'l- ARB. 1, 3 (2006). The unlikelihood of obtaining these remedies due to
financial feasibility and political considerations has caused these authors to call a
victory of an investor in such position a "pyrrhic victory." Id. Probably, this explains why, even after all the trouble that Argentina has caused in enforcing ICSID
awards no investor has resorted yet to these types of diplomatic protections. Investors may still have a last hope that Argentina will pay, especially, since it has
recently acceded to negotiate commitment letters with claimants in annulment
proceedings (e.g., Vivendi case), even if Argentina has made it clear that it will not
enforce an award that does not comply with internal law. See Letter Number 109/
A 1108, Letter from Osvaldo Cesar Guglielmino, General Counsel of Argentina's
Secretary of the Treasury, to Mr. Frutos- Peterson, ICSID Secretary General (Nov.
28, 2008) available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/.
Autopista Concesionaria de Venez., ICStD Case No.ARB/00/5 (2003) (title taken
from a World Bank press release).
Marco Montanes, Bolivia's Denunciation of the ICSID Convention, INTFRNATIO0NAL_ LAW IN BRIEF, May 16, 2007, http://www.asil.orgilib070727.cfm#r3.
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tential implications of adopting one posture over others may result in entirely different procedural consequences.
1. Background
Bolivia's decision to withdraw from ICSID arose in the midst of a drastic change in the hydrocarbons sector undertaken by the Bolivian government. Joining the trend of other Latin American Nations, President
Jaime Paz Zamora (who served from 1989 to 1993), implemented in Bolivia a major legal reform in order to attract FDI.8 8 During Paz Zamora's
presidency, the Legislature enacted the first Investment and Privatization
Acts, and the country became a member of the Multilateral Investment
Agency (MIGA), the overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC),
and ICSID.89 Also, approximately thirty percent of the country's BITs
were signed during Paz Zamora's presidency. 9 0
In 1994 President Sdnchez de Lozada (Paz Zamora's successor), who
remembered well the hyper-inflation experienced in the country in the
1980s, 9 1 privatized several state-owned companies, including five of the
largest companies in the country (through the Capitalization Act of
1994).92 Because of Bolivia's vast reserves of non-associated natural gas,
the most important of these privatizations related to the natural gas industry. The 1996 modification of the Hydrocarbons Law was essential to
88. Jorge Quiroga, Minister of Finance of Paz Zamora's

government (and later Presi-

dent of Bolivia), Speech for the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars in Washington D.C., (July 15, 1992) (transcript available in the Richter Library at the
University of Miami). In his speech, Jorge Ouiroga said:
"the Bolivian government wants the private sector to be perfectly aligned with the productive sector-hydrocarbons, mining, and services.
That is a three-stage process. The government is selling all the productive enterprises, although there are more than sixty, such as ceramic, textiles, and small airlines. Joint ventures in hydrocarbons and mining are
also being undertaken because, due to constitutional restrictions, the
government cannot sell them. We are also moving into services, but regulatory framework must first be developed. Federal regulatory agencies,
which we do not have, are good in certain instances. The government
does not want to transform public monopolies into private monopolies
overnight, as has happened in other countries in Latin America. Subsidized credit has been eliminated in Bolivia. This will allow for an increase
flow of resources from the private sector. If the government sends a signal
to the private investors-'This is your area, it is open to you, we will provide an In vestment Law and the necessary regulatoryframework, so come
[to] invest'-then I think the private sector will react." (emphasis added)

89. See JULIUS SPATZ, POVERTY AND) INEQUAI-1-1-Y IN -THE;EiL
1FORMS 10 (2006).

OF STRUCTURAi- RE-

90. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Country-Specific List of
BITs, http://www.unctad.orglTemplates/Page.asp?intltem] D=2344&lang=l (last
visited July 7, 2010).
91. See generally, Luis Breuer, Hyperinflation and Stabilization: The Case of Bolivia
1984-1986, (1989) (unpublished doctoral thesis) (on file with the University of Illinois at Urban a-Ch ampaign).
92. See SPIATZ, supra note 89, at 11.
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the privatization of the hydrocarbons industry.93 Among other controversial provisions, the new law established royalties for up to eighteen
percent of the gas production. 94 Simultaneously, new contracts for the
exploration and exploitation of non-associated gas were negotiated and
entered into by the Bolivian government and private foreign investors,
by-passing the Constitutional mandate of legislative approval. For this
same reason these contracts would be invalidated some years later.9 5 It is
important to underscore, however, that FDI bloomed in Bolivia overall
during the 1990s. 96
Sdnchez de Lozada's first term (1993-1997) was followed by a former
dictator and retired General, Hugo Banzer (1997-2001).97 President
Banzer continued the trend of privatization and 'modernization,' and put
a special emphasis on the eradication of coca plantations, until he had to
resign because of a serious medical condition. 98 His Vice-President,
Jorge Quiroga, took office and concluded the term a year later. 99
Sdnchez de Lozada subsequently served a second term, in which he heavily raised taxes, after the adoption of an IMIF program, and faced the
turmoil of the so-called 'gas war.' 0 0 After fifteen days of riots President
Sanchez de Lozada resigned and his Vice-President Carlos Mesa assumed
office (2003-2005).10 In 2004 President Mesa called for a National Referendum on a new Hydrocarbons Law, which was voted in his favor. 102
The new law proposed a raise in the taxes associated with production and
increased the percentage of State participation in hydrocarbons activities,
including the production of oil and gas. 103 It still did not receive the gen93. Eugenio Cerutti & Mario Mansilla, Bolivia: The Hydrocarbons Boom and the
Risk of Dutch Disease, 4 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 08/154, 2008),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp08154.pdf.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Julius Spatz, FDI and Economic Growth in Developing Economies: How Relevant
are Host-Economy and Industry Characteristics?,13 TRANSNAT'L COR's. 52, 86
(2004).
97. Manuel E. Contreras & Maria Luisa Talaverna Simoni, The Bolivian Education
Reform: Case Studies in Large-Scale Education Reform, 2 EDUCATION REIORM
ANID MANAGEMENT PUBLICATION SEIlES 1, 10 (2003), available at http://www.oei.

98.

es/oeivirt/Bolivian.pdf.
LARRY STORRS & NINA
FY12002 ASSISTANCE

FOR

SERAFINO,

COLUMBIA

ANDEAN REGIONAL INITIATIVE (ARI):
AND NEIGHBORS, CONGRESSIONAL RE-

SEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS 1 (2001), availableat http://fpc.state.gov/

documents/organization/6566.pdf.
99. Id.
100. See Roberto Chacon de Albuquerque, The Disappropriationof Foreign Companies Involved in the Exploration, Exploitation, and Commercializationof Hydrocarbons in Bolivia, 14 L. & Bus. Rv. AM. 21, 31 (in 1883, Bolivia lost its coastline
to Chile in the War of the Pacific. The riots of the gas-war were a consequence of
a plan to build a pipeline to pump gas to the Chilean coasts to be exported to
Mexico and the United States. This turned out to be a terrible idea due to a histor-

ical rivalry with Chile).
101.

Benjamin Dangl, An Overview of Bolivia's Gas War, UPSIDE DOWN WORLD, http:/
lupsidedownworld.org/gaswar.htm (last visited July 7, 2010).

102. Contreras & Simoni, supra note 97, at 32, 36.
103. Center for Energy Economics, Appendix & Companion to: Chapter 16-Hydrocarbon Sector Regulation and Cross-Border Trade in the Western Hemisphere, 2-3
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eral approval of both the population and the investors.1 0 4 A few days
later President Mesa resigned and the Bolivia's Chief Justice, Mr.
Eduardo Rodriguez, assumed office for a six month period (2005-2006)
until the leftist leader Evo Morales was elected on a general election
(2006-2009), and subsequently reelected (2009- present). 0 5
In his inaugural speech Morales explicitly stated "it is true that Bolivia
needs partners, not owners of our natural resources .

.

. We'll guarantee

the foreign companies the right to recover what they invested, and also
the right to have some profit; but, we just want the people to benefit from
these resources." 106 In this sense, one of the first measures taken by
President Morales' government was to issue Decree 28701 nationalizing
the entire hydrocarbon industry.' 0 7 The following day, May 1, 2006, President Morales militarized the oil and gas fields to ensure the decree's enforcement. 0 8 Exactly one year later Bolivia formally notified the ICSID
Secretariat of its withdrawal from the Washington Convention.
On January 25, 2009 President Morales' proposal of a new constitution
was passed by referendum with the approval of sixty-one percent of the
population. 10 9 Bolivia's new constitution has been described as pro-indigenous and reluctant to FDI.1' 0 An important change that merits underscoring is the new Article 366, which states that in the hydrocarbons
sector foreign companies will not be able to sue Bolivia in any foreign
jurisdiction nor resort to international arbitration or diplomatic protection."' This provision reinforces Bolivia's reluctance to appear before

104.
105.
106.
107.

(Univ. of Tex. at Austin, Working Paper 2007), available at http://www.beg.utexas.
edu/energyecon/documents/CEEHydrocarbonRegulationAppendix.pdf.
See ELEODORO MAYORGA & ALEJANDRO TAPIA, TIE GAS ERA 164 (2006).
Election Tracker, GLOBAL MONITOR, http://www.angus-reid.com/tracker/view/8124
(last visited July 7, 2010).
See Lindsay Sykes Pinto, Resolving the Bolivian Gas Crisis: Lessonsfrom Bolivia's
Brush with International Arbitration, 39 GEo. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 947, 949
(2007).
Id. at 955 (noting that "Morales deployed soldiers to Bolivia's petroleum fields on
the same day the Decree was issued, drawing international attention and prompting statements of concern from Bolivia's largest investors, Brazil and Spain. Although these investors renewed and strengthened their threats to take Bolivia to
international arbitration, none followed through: all ultimately signed new contracts within the timeframe specified by Decree 28701 and remain operating in
Bolivia today").

108. CLARE M. RIBANno, BoiVIA:

POUTICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND
RELAIONS WITH THE UNFI1o STATES, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCII SERVIcE RE-

(2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
RL32580.pdf.
109. Adam Kott & David Rosenblum Felson, Chavez and Morales Force Sweeping
PORT FOR CONGRESS, 10-11

Land Reform Measures,

LATIN

AM.

ON T-ilE

EDGE, May 5, 2009, http://www.the

cuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=11296&pageid=13&pagename=Analysis.
110. See Fernando Cabrera, Bolivian Voters Approve New Constitution as Government
Continues to Nationalize Oil Assets, INv. TREATY NEws, Feb. 4, 2009, http://www.

investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2009/02/04/bolivian-voters-approvenew-constitution-as-government-continues-to-nationalize-oil-assets.aspx.
111. ADRIAN BARRENECHES & DANIEL MARIACA, Bolivia, The International Comparative Legal Guide to: Gas Regulation 35 (2010), availableat http://www.iclg.co.uk/
khadmin/Publications/pdf/3388.pdf.
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ICSID. 1 12 But even with a constitutional provision outlawing LCSID and
other foreign tribunals' Jurisdiction, an ICSID panel will still be entirely
independent to find jurisdiction in the case a claim arises in such forum.
2. Bolivia Membership Status
Given that Bolivia's withdrawal was formally communicated to the ICSID's Secretariat on May 2, 2007, in accordance with §72's six-month
rule, the last day in which Bolivia was effectively considered a Contracting State of the Washington Convention was November 2, 2007.113
Therefore, it was perfectly understandable why the LCSID Secretariat
registered the case E. T.I. Euro Telecom InternationalN. V. v. Republic of
Bolivia,"14 on Wednesday October 31, 2007.
There are grounds to believe that by registering this case the ICSID did
not take any posture on the following discussion about consent, since at
that date, Bolivia was still technically a member State of the Washington
Convention. The authors Tietje, Nowrot, and Wackernagel, however, believe otherwise. The ICSID Secretariat, by registering the case, found
that the case was not 'manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Centre,' in
the sense established by §36(3) of the Convention." 5 According to these
authors, by taking this action the JCSID Secretariat adopted a position
contrary to the potential argument that Bolivia was not subject to the
Centre's jurisdiction since the date of the notification of denunciation
(May 2, 2007), and not six months later, as established in §72.116
3. From 'Offer to Consent' to [just] 'Consent'
The effects of a Bolivia's denunciation of the Washington Convention
raise the topic of the interplay between §25(1), §72 and, §71 of the Convention. The first two articles contain references to the consent of the
parties, while the third section relates to right to denunciation. But none
112. See id. (article 366 provides that all foreign companies with activities in the hydrocarbons productive chain on behalf of the State will be subjected to the Sovereignty of the State, the laws, and the authorities of the State. No foreign tribunal
or jurisdiction will be recognized in any event, and [these companies] may not
resort to any instanice uf international arbitration or diplomatic channels to resolve
their disputes).
113.

MIGUEL SOLANES & ANDRFI JOURAVLFV, REVISITING PRIVATI~ZATION, FORE IGN
INVESTMENT,
I NTERNA4I1ONAI
ARBITRATION,
AND
WATrE.R,
RECURSOS
NATURALES E INFRAsTRUCTURA 9 (2007), available at http://www.iatp.orgltrade

observatory/library.cfm?reflD=101 503.
114. See E.TL Euro Telecom Int'l N. V. v. Republic of Bol., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/28
(2008).
115. Washington Convention, supra note 11, at § 36(3) (section 36(3) of the Washington
Convention establishes that "Thbe Secretary-General shall register the request unless he finds, on the basis of the information contained in the request, that the
dispute is manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Centre. He shall forthwith notify the parties of registration or refusal to register").
116. See CHRISTIAN TiETIE ET AL., ONCE AND FOREVER? TI-iE LEGAL EFECT1S OF A
DENUNCIATION OF ICSID 12, INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC LAW OF THI' MARTIN LuTH1ER UNIVERSITY HALLE-Wri1-I-ENBERC SCHOOL OF LAW (2007), available at
www.wirtschaftsrecht.uni-halle.defHeft74.pdf.
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of them explicitly defines what constitutes such consent. As part of the
Chapter 11 of the Convention, regarding the jurisdiction of the Centre,
§25(1) establishes that:
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or
any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to
submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no
7
party may withdraw its consent unilaterally. (emphasis added)."1
As part of Chapter VI of the Convention, which contains the final provisions, §72 establish that:
Notice by a Contracting State pursuant to Articles 70 or 71 shall not
affect the rights or obligations under this Convention of that State or
of any of its constituent subdivisions or agencies or of any national of
that State arising out of consent to the jurisdiction of the Centre given
by one of them before such notice was received by the depositary."18
(emphasis added).
And, §71 of the same section establish that: "[a]ny Contracting State
may denounce this Convention by written notice to the depositary of this
Convention. The denunciation shall take effect six months after receipt
of such notice."' 1 9 Then, the critical question is whether the effects of the
protection contained in §71 may be extended due to the mandate of
§25(1), even after the denunciation of the Washington Convention under
§72. Any analysis in this area must pay special attention to the different
sources of consent, whether contractual (through an investment agreement), or non-contractual (through Investment Protection Laws, BITs, or
MITs). For instance, if a BIT is found to constitute consent in the meaning of §25(1), the denunciation of the Convention as per §72, may not
affect the ability of investors who are nationals of the other contracting
country of the BIT, to hail the host country before the ICSID, during the
existence of such consent, which is also to say "during the validity of the
BIT."
The most controversial issue here is the legal nature of the arbitration
clause contained in most BITs. In this particular issue there are some
differing points of view. While some scholars believe that at most a BIT
contains a unilateral offer to consent to the jurisdiction of the Centre
which must be "perfected" by further acceptance by the investor, others
believe that a BIT pledges the consent of the country to submit to the
jurisdiction of the Centre during the validity of such instrument. The potential applicability of any of these views in Bolivia is clear: the supporters of the offer to consent theory believe that no other case could be filed
by or against Bolivia before the ICSID, after November 2, 2007; while the
117. Washington Convention, supra note 11, art. 25(1).
118. Washington Convention, supra note 11, art. 72.
119. Washington Convention, supra note 11, art. 71 (emphasis added).
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detractors believe otherwise. 12 0
4.

Offer to Consent

Professor Christoph Schreuer is of the opinion that "a provision on
consent in a BIT is merely an offer by the respective States that requires
acceptance by the other party ... [which], may be accepted by a national
of the other State party to the BIT."' 2 ' In this sense, "consent is only
perfected after it has been accepted by both parties. Therefore, a unilateral offer of consent by the host State through legislation or a treaty
before a notice under Arts. 70 or 71 would not suffice."112 2
This line of reasoning implies that the only way an investor may sue the
host state before ICSID after denunciation is by having given notice in
writing of his consent as required by §25(1), and thus perfecting the consent. Under this theory, the investor must always "perform some reciprocal act to perfect consent." 12 3 Consequently, if the country has
withdrawn its unilateral offer to consent prior the perfection of such consent, the investor will no longer be able to sue before ICSID. The consequences of his position were recently reiterated by Professor Schreuter in
relation to Bolivia's case.' 2 4 By the same token, perhaps the most cited
text in this subject is a discussion between Aron Broches and various
country representatives at the origins of the Washington Convention.
This conversation certainly reflects the position of the founding fathers of
the Convention. At some point, Broches explained that the effects of the
Convention would be extended after denunciation. In contractual cases:
Mr. Broches replied that the intention of Article 73 [today's §72] in
the text submitted to the Directors was to make it clear that if a State
had consented to arbitration,for instance by entering into an arbitration clause with an investor, the subsequent denunciation of the Convention by that State would not relieve it from its obligation to go to
arbitration if a dispute arouse .'2 5 (emphasis added).

120. 1 am of the opinion that by registering this case the ICSID did not take any posture
on the following discussion about consent, since Bolivia was still technically a
member State of the Washinigtoni Convention, at that date. However, the authors
of a comprehensive study on the subject (discussed below) believe otherwise.
121. See CIIRISTroI II SCHREUEIR, Tin- ICSID CONVENT ION: A COMMENTARY 7 (2001).
122. Id. at 1286.
123. Id. at 206.
124. See Bolivia Notifies World Bank of Withdrawal from ICSID, Pursues BIT Revisions, INVESTME~NT TREATY Ni-ws, May 9, 2007, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/itnmay9.2007.pdf (Here, Professor Schreuer goes even further by stating that "If you
look closer . .. the six month notice period offers very little comfort to investors
and potential litigants."); see Sebastian Manciaux, La Bolivie se Retire du Cirdi
(Sept. 2007), available at www.transnational-dispute-management.com (last visited
on Nov. 23, 2008) (it is also important to add Professor Sebastian Manciaux of the
University of Bourgogne to the list of proponents of the offer to consent theory).
125. INTr'L CTR. F-OR SF3TLiEMFNTYI OF INv. Dispumrs, HISTORY OF- THE ICSID CON VEN
-rilN: Documim-Nrs

CONCERNING THi-E ORIGIN AND TI-I
FORMULATION OF THE
CONVENTION ON T1-11 SEITIIEMENT OF INVESMNT Dispu-ms BFTrWEEN STATES
AND NATIONALS OF OTHEFR STATES Voi- 11, 1009 (1968).
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Mr. Broches replied that if the agreement with the company included
an arbitrationclause and that agreement lasted for say 20 years, that
State would still be bound to submit its disputes with that company
under that agreement to the Centre.' 2 6 (emphasis added).
The conversation touched upon the subject of subsequent application
of the Convention after denunciation in non-contractual and indefinite
cases. Here, the participants expressly discussed the drafting of the current §72, to ensure a correct outcome in the hypothetical case of a country withdrawal from the Convention, while having BITs in force,
mentioning the Centre.
Mr. Gutierrez Cano said that Article 73 [today's §72] in the new text
was lacking a time limit beyond which the Convention would cease
to apply. Unless such time limit was introduced States would be
bound indefinitely. He had in mind the case in which there was no
agreement between the State and the foreign investor but only a general declaration on the part of the State in favor of submission of
claims to the Centre and a subsequent withdrawal from the Convyention by that State before any claim had been in fact submitted to the
Centre. Would the Convention still compel the State to accept the
jurisdiction of the Centre? 12 7 (emphasis added)
By answering Mr. Gutierrez-Cano's question, Broches, who is considered the father of the Convention, 2 8 establishes his position on the offer
to consent discussion. It is important to remark that his answer was given
in the context of explaining the scope and reach of §72, which is the
source of this entire discussion. He said that:
A general statement of the kind mentioned by Mr. Guiterrez-Cano
[a BIT with an ICSID arbitration clause] would not be binding on the
State which had made it until it had been accepted by the investor. If
the State withdraws its unilateralstatement by denouncing the Convyention before it has been accepted by any investor, no investor could
later bring a claim before the Centre. If, however, the unilateral offer
of the State has been accepted before the denunciation of the Convention, then disputes arising between the State and the investor after the date of denunciation will still be within the jurisdiction of the
Centre.' 2 9 (emphasis added).
With these words Aron Broches noted that the consent that may be
contained in BITs is a mere offer to consent, subject to acceptance by the
investor. In fact, in an early scholarly article about the Centre, Broches
specifically stated that:
the consent of the investor may be evidenced by an express statement to that effect made to the host State, or it may be given at the
time when the investor institutes proceedings against the host State.
It must, however, be remembered that each party's consent becomes
126. Id. at 1010.
127. Id.
128. Lowenfeld, supra note 48, at 123.
129. Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, supra note 125, at 1010.
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irrevocable only after both parties have given it. Therefore, in the examples last mentioned [one of them refers to a BIT case], the host
State could withdraw its consent as long as the investor had not
equally consented.130 (emphasis added).
It is also important to remark that most of these discussions have been
widely interpreted by the detractors of this theory in their writings. So
even when the words of Mr. Broches seem to be self-explanatory, some
authors (as seen below) try to find an explanation that would not invalidate the opposing theory: The strength of this offer-to-consent theory
resides precisely in its historical roots, which links it to the very foundation of the Centre. Recently, a French author stated that:
[t]his viewpoint appears less than convincing as all the history of the
Convention, combined with the writings of the most qualified authors, and customary international law point in the same direction:
an offer to arbitrate is a proposal to do a thing. ...usually accompanied by an expected acceptance, counter-offer, return promise or
3

act.'1 1

In sum, if Bolivia's only source of non-contractual consent to ICSJD
jurisdiction were contained in its Investment Protections Law, the proponents of the offer-to-consent theory would not have much of a problem.
Once the law has been abrogated, the consent would have disappeared
for of everybody. The problem arises when the parties of the dispute in
question try to assert jurisdiction on a BIT. Here, the proponents of this
view hold that even when the BIT in question is still in effect (because it
has not been denounced or it is still in effect under the term established
by the survival clause) after the expiration of the six months established
in §72 the country, in this case Bolivia, may no longer be hailed into
ICSID.
5.

[just] Consent

This theory comprises different readings to the aforementioned interplay between §25(1), §71, and §72 of the Washington Convention. First,
Professor Gaillard argues that great weight should be given to the actual
language of the BITs. According to this author, wherever there is consent and not an offer to consent in the BIT, ICSID would still have jurisdiction even after denunciation. 13 2 Second, another study proposes the
use of dynamic interpretation. The authors of this study state that:
130. Broches, supra note 48, at 353.
131. Julian Fouret, Denunciation of the Washington Convention and Non-Contractual
Investment Arbitration: "Manufacturing Consent" to ICSID Arbitration?, 25 J.
IN r'i- ARI3. 80, 80 (2008). In fact, Fouret adopts a drastic position by considering
that this discussion is a fake one, invented by the creativity of practitioners in the
field. Id. at 81. To him "[. ..I]it seems easy to determine the correct interpretation:
consent is an exchange and not a unilateral act;" to support his findings he quotes
the findings of an ICSID tribunal in the case Salini v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID
ARB/00/4 (July 23, 2001) (Decision on Jurisdiction). Id. at 87.
132. Emmanuel Gaillard, The Denunciation of the JCSID Convention, 237 N.Y. L. J. 3
(2007).
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[ilt seems to be more than appropriate to apply the principle of dynamic treaty interpretation also to the ICSID Convention and
thereby provide an understanding of the regulatory interplay of its
articles 25 and 72 in conformity with present-day conditions of consenting to ICSID arbitration that does not run contrary to the original and current object and purpose of the Convention.' 3 3
Finally, two practitioners from a prestigious law firm have published an
article supporting this theory through an approach linked to the international obligation to State consent.' 3 4 This approach is based primarily on
the dissenting vote of Arbitrator Francisco Orrego Vicufla in the case
Waguih Elie Georg Siag & Clorinda Vecchi v. Egypt,' 3 5 and general principles of international law, specifically those related to good faith and
unilateral declarations.
a.

Professor Gaillard's Point of View:

E. Gaillard explains that "consent to ICSID jurisdiction does not result
from a State's status as Contracting Party to the Convention but, in accordance to §25(1), requires both parties' written consent to the Centre's
jurisdiction. "13 6 Then the explanation on consent begins by commenting
on the discussion transcribed above between Aron Broches and other
country representatives.137 His posture in this particular area is simple,
but very interesting:
[hiad the drafters of the ICSID Convention intended to refer to a
State's 'agreement to consent' rather than to its 'consent,' they would
have so provided. As a result, a denouncing State's consent to the
jurisdiction of the Centre based on an investment protection treaty
depends on the terminology used in the arbitration clause contained
in that treaty.' 3 8
To clarify his position Professor Gaillard divides the types of consent
contained in the different BITs as "unqualified consent," and "agreements to consent."'13 9 An example of the former is found in the language
of §11 of the Bolivia-Germany BIT (use of the word 'shall'),' 4 0 and an
133. CHRISTIIAN TIETJF iT AL., supra

note 116, at 23.

134. See generally Michael Nolan & F.G. Sourgens, The Interplay Between State Consent to ICSID Arbitration and Denunciation of the ICSID Convention: The (Possible) Venezuela Case Study, TRANSNAT' r. Djsvu'ni MGmTr., Sept. 2007, available at
http://www.milbank.com/NR/rdonlyres/A49BAAD9-E6C3-40C8-ABC1 -7DFA99
B4E3FB/0/TDM Nolan..Sourgens Milbank.pdf.
135. Siag v. Egypt, ICSID ARB05/15 (Apr. 15, 2007) (Decision on Jurisdiction).
136. Emmanuel Gaillard, Anti-Arbitration Trends in Latin America, 237 N.Y. L. J. 2
(2008).
137. Gaillard, supra note 132.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Treaty Concerning the Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investments, Bol.F.R.G., art. 11, 913, Mar. 23, 1987, 1706 U.N.T.S. 29497 (section 11(3) of the Bolivia-Germany BIT establishes that: "If both Contracting Parties are parties to the
Convention of 18 March 1965 on the settlement of investment disputes between
States and nationals of other States, any disputes between either Contracting Party
and an investor, as referred to in the article, shall be submitted, in accordance with
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example of the latter may be found in §8 of the Bolivia-United Kingdom
BIT (use of the word 'may'). 1 4 ' In his opinion, "where an unqualified
consent exists, as opposed to an agreement to consent, the rights and obligations attached to this consent should not be affected by the denuncia-

tion of the ICSID Convention."'14 2
b.

Tietje, Nowrot & Wackernagel Study:

These German Professors advocate for the dynamic treaty interpretation established in the Tyrer v. United Kingdom case, before the European Court of Human Rights. In this case, an International Treaty was
considered "a living instrument which . .. must be interpreted in the light
of present-day conditions."'14 3 Accordingly, these Professors propose the
application of this same methodology (i.e., the so-called "dynamic interpretation" of treaties) to the discussion of the founding fathers of the
Washington Convention, in particular, to Mr. Broches' remarks. They
believe that their suggestion finds strong support in §31(3)(9) of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, which establishes the general
rule of treaty interpretation and proscribes that "there shall be taken into
account, together with the context: (c) any relevant rule of International
law applicable in the relations between the parties."'14 4
The application of the dynamic treaty interpretation methodology to
ICSID cases would drive these Professors to look at the "extraordinary
number of international investment agreements that have entered into
force since the adoption of the ICSID Convention, in particular more
than 2,500 BITs, but also the more than 240 other international agreements that deal with economic activities and also contain investment

provisions."114 5

Aside from the socio-economic and legal developments, another element to consider in this innovative methodology is the cause of such developments. Accordingly, these authors found that "all of these
agreements are at least primarily also aimed at the promotion of foreign

141.

142.
143.
144.

145.

the rules of the laid Convention, to mediation and arbitration by the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.") (emphasis added).
Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Bolivia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-Bol., art. 8, 2, May 24, 1988. 1640
U.N.T.S. 1990 (section 8(2) of the Bolivia-United Kingdom establishes that:
"Where the dispute is referred to international arbitration, the investor and the
Contracting Party concerned in the dispute may agree to refer the dispute either to:
(a) the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes[ ... ]I") (emphasis added).
Gaillard, supra note 132.
Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Fur. Ct. H.R. 31 (1978).
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31,
3(c), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (even though when The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
would be applicable as a primary source of law only to Contracting States, its content is nowadays widely considered part of the customary provisions of International law and applicable as established in § 38(b) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice).
CHRIsTI[AN TIETJTE ET AL., supra note 116, at 23.
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investment and, in order to reach that goal, at providing private investors
with additional legal safeguards. " 4 6 Thus, the principle of dynamic
treaty interpretation would provide a "balanced interpretative approach
of upholding the original and still current objects and purposes of the
ICSID Convention by taking into account subsequent developments in
the realm of international law."114 7 Finally, by applying this principle to
the issue of consent, these authors find that "if the respective BIT provides for consent this may only be revoked by bringing to a final end the
legal effects of the BIT."1148 In other words, Professors 'Jietje, Nowrot,
and Wackernagel believe that Bolivia might be taken before ICSID after
November 2, 2007, as long as its BITs referring to the jurisdiction of the
Centre are still in effect, which includes the duration of the survival
clauses.
c. Nolan & Sourgens Approach:
As briefly mentioned above this approach takes into consideration the
dissenting vote Arbitrator Francisco Orrego Vicufla in the case Waguih
Elie Heorg Siag & Clorinda Vecchi v. Egypt, and general principles of
International law, specifically those related to good faith, and unilateral
declarations. According to Orrego's partial dissent:
[ ... ]the common situation became one where the State expresses its
consent in the treaty and later the investor expresses its own consent
in either a separate instrument or by simply applying to the Centre
for the registration of its claim. At that point the expression of consent became decoupled and separated by a lapse of time, many times
long. It has been often understood that the consent of the State was an
offer, which upon acceptance by the investor became the consent to
arbitration.
This is the situation later reflected in Rule 2 of the ICSID Institution
Rules which takes the "[d]ate of consent" to mean, when both parties did not act simultaneously, the date in which the second party
acted, which is usually the case of the investor.
Yet, the date in which the State expresses its consent in the treaty is not
just an offer. It is much more than that and it has special legal effects,
including obligations of the host State under the treaty and the prohibition to exercise diplomatic protection by the other Contracting
Party. The date of expression of consent for the State is that of the
entry into force of the treaty or some other instrument which embodies
consent. When this consent is later matched by the consent of the foreign investor, the required conditions for submitting the dispute to arbitration are met, but the respective expressions of consent do not
appear to change their dates."t 14 9 (emphasis added).
146. Id.

Id. at 28.
148. Id. at 27.
147.

149. Siag, supra note 135.
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According to these authors, the core of Professor Orrego's remarks has
a dichotomous foundation: even though the Washington Convention was
drafted following a contractual type of consent in mind, this would not
"affect the nature of international obligations incurred by the States in
their ICSID consent."115 0 Hence, in their view, the consent given by a
state in their BITs would amount to international obligations of such nation. The nature of these unilateral declarations was established in the
case New Zealand v. France (a.k.a., the Nuclear Test Case), in which the
International Court of Justice highlighted the differences between a private unilateral promise and a public unilateral promise, holding that the
latter constitutes an International obligation binding upon such country. 51 In words of Nolan and Sourgens: "promises made by sovereigns
are qualitatively different from those made by private individuals, as axiomatically all promises of the sovereign on the international stage are
binding as a matter of international law."'15 2
Finally, these authors conclude their interesting theory by stating that if
the consent contained in BITs is deemed as a valid International obligation of a country, this finding would be contrary to the offer-to-consent
theory. Therefore, the consent of BITs would be sufficient to assert ICSID's jurisdiction, even after a country denounces the Washington Convention. In their own words:
[i]f undertakings to arbitrate investment disputes with private investors in bilateral investment treaties and national investment laws are
understood as independent international obligations, that a state's
consent to ICSID arbitration operates as more than an offer to arbitrate. An implication is that denunciation by a state should not necessarily be viewed as immediately putting an end to the investor's ability
to invoke ICSID jurisdiction for an arbitration against that state.15 3
(emphasis added).
Accordingly, under this theory, Bolivia could still be sue in ICSID by
investors nationals of countries with which Bolivia maintains BITs with
ICSID arbitration clauses in force.'15 4

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Nolan, supra note 134, at 25-26.
Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 472 (Dec. 20).
Nolan, supra note 134, at 28.
Id. at 31.
Other notable practitioners from all over the world have advocated for a similar
result. For instance, Timothy G. Nelson, from Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom in New York, says that: "any implication that withdrawing from ICSID closes
the door on expropriation cases is simply incorrect." Bolivia Withdraws from ICSID, LATI1N LAWYER, may 2007, http://www.americasnet.net/news/BoliviaICSID.
pdf. Similarly, Jose Rafael Bermudez, from Bermudez, Nevett, Mezquita & Lopez
in Caracas, holds that "any BITs containing consent to ICSID would stand, and
that the Venezuelan government would have to also denounce those treaties to
fully withdraw." Id. Of course, after denouncing the BITs, the survival period
would have to lapsed, in order to fulfill a complete exit from ICSID.
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6. A Look Into the Future, and the Availability of Potential Avenues
for Investors Harmed by Bolivia
Currently, it is impossible to predict with certainty what position is going to be adopted by ICSID Secretariat or by an ICSID Tribunal. The
explanation about consent seems to be too abstract, but with significant
potential consequences. On the one hand, it seems like the natural path
would be to follow the offer-to-consent theory as this was advocated by
the drafters of the Convention. But the other theory is supported by at
least three persuasive explanations that seek to tailor any solution on a
case-by-case basis, either by looking at the actual language of the BITs,
or by undertaking a comprehensive dynamic interpretation.
For this reason, the safest grounds would probably be to expect that the
theory of offer-to-consent is going to be applied, and hence, that Bolivia
may no longer be hailed into ICSID. Despite the fact that Bolivia's move
to withdraw from ICSID may potentially bring disastrous consequences
to future inflows of FDI, our attention now must focus on the already
existing FDI in Bolivia. Here, the logical issue that arises is whether existing foreign investors in Bolivia will be left totally unprotected in the
eventual case that the government, for instance, decides to expropriate
them without paying just compensation.
The answer is probably no. The vast majority of Bolivia's BITs, for
example, contemplate the possibility of resorting to UNCITRAL ad hoc
arbitration, an option that may be particularly appealing at this stage,
especially given that Bolivia is a signatory of the New York on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Notwithstanding
this, there are some BITs concerning Bolivia, like the Bolivia-Belgium
BIT, which refers to ICSID,15 5 and other avenues (such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris, and the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce) but does not refer to
UNCITRAL ad hoc arbitration.
155. Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), Belg.-Bol., art. 11, 1 3, Apr. 25, 1990 (section
11(3) of Bolivia-Belgium BIT establishes that: En cas de recours AI'arbitrage international, le diff6rend est soumis Al'un des organismes d'arbitrage d6sign6s ciaprbs, au choix de l'investisseur : le Centre international pour le R~glement des
Diff6rends relatifs aux investissements (CIRDI), cr66 par "la Convention pour le
raglement des diff6rends relatifs aux investissements entre Etats et ressortissants
d'autres Etats", ouverte Ala signature AWashington, le 18 mars 1965, lorsque
chaque Etat partie au pr6sent Accord sera membre de celle-ci. Aussi longtemps
que cette condition n'est pas remplie, chacune des Parties contractants consent A
ce que le diff6rend soit soumis AI'arbitrage conform6ment au reglement du M&
canisme suppl6mentaire du CIRDI;1e Tribunal d'Arbitrage de la Chambre de
Commerce Internationale, AParis; l'Institut d'Arbitrage de la Chambre de Commerce de Stockholm. Si la procddure d'arbitrage est introduite Al'initiative d'une
Partie contractante, celle-ci invitera par 6crit I'investisseur concern6 A exprimer
son choix quant l'organisme d'arbitrage qui devra 6tre saisi du diff6rend. Accord
entre l'Union 6conomique belgo-luxembourgeoise et le Gouvernement de la R6publique de Bolivie concernant I'encouragement et la protection r6ciproques des
investissements)."
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The question that has been asked here is whether the famous "MostFavored-Nation" clause ("MFNC"), which is included very often in BITs,
can be used to extend the UNCITRAL ad hoc arbitration option to other
cases. For instance, as seen above, investors from Belgium do not have
the option to initiate an UNCITRAL ad hoc arbitration against Bolivia;
however, at the same time their BIT contains the MiFNC in §12, which
establishes that: "for all the issues related to the treatment of investments, the investors from either Contracting party enjoy, on the territory
of the other party, the most-favored-nation treatment."'15 6
The case-law of the different arbitral tribunals in this particular issue
seems to be inconsistent. In the cases Mafezzini,15 7 Siemens,1 58 Gas Natural,'"9 and Suez, 16 0 different tribunals interpreted "silence or ambiguity
as indicative that the MIFNC included, with certain limits, procedural provisions."'16 ' On the other hand, in the cases of Plama,16 2 Salini.'6 3 and
Telenor164 different tribunals found it impossible to use the MFNC to
"by-pass a limitation in the very same BIT when the parties have not
chosen language in the MFN clause showing an intention to do this, as
has been done in some BITs."1165 Therefore, it remains unclear whether
the M[FNC could be used for extending jurisdiction to an ad hoc arbitral
tribunal, governed by the UNCLTRAL rules. But, in the rare cases where
UNCITRAL arbitration is not an option, an ICC arbitration could then
be an ideal venue for the investors.
156. Id. art. 12. (section 12 provides "Pour toutes les questions relatives au traitment
des investissments, les investisseurs de chacune des Parties contractantes
bdn~ficient, sur le territoire de l'autre Partie, du traitement de la nation Ia plus
favoris~e").
157. Mafezini v. Spain, ICSID ARB/9717 (2000) (Decision on Jurisdiction) (the tribunal
held that "if a third-party treaty contained provisions for the settlement of disputes
that are more favorable to the protection of the investor's rights and interests than
those in the basic treaty, such provisions may be extended to the beneficiary of the
most-favored-nation clause as they are fully compatible with the ejusdem generis
principle).
158. Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, ICSID ARBO2I8 (2004) (Decision on Jurisdiction).
159. Gas Natural SDG, S.A v. Argentina, ICSID ARB/03/10 (2005) (Decision of the
Tribunal on Preliminary Questions on Jurisdiction) (The tribunal held that
"[u]nless it appears clearly that the State parties to a BIT or the parties to a particular investment agreement settled on a different method for resolution of disputes
that may arise most-favored-nation provisions in BITs should be understood to be
applicable to dispute settlement").
160. Suez v. Argentina, ICSID ARBIO3/17 (May 16, 2006) (Decision on Jurisdiction).
161. Alejandro Faya Rodriguez, The Most-Favored-Nation Clause in International Investment Agreements, 25 J. INT'i_ ARB. 95, 104 (2008).
162. Plama Consortium Ltd v. Bulgaria, ICSID ARBIO3/04 (2005) (Decision on Jurisdiction) (the tribunal held that "an MFN provision in a basic treaty does not incorporate by reference dispute settlement provisions in whole or in part set forth in
another treaty, unless the MEN provision in the basic treaty leaves no doubt that
the Contracting Parties intended to incorporate them.").
163. Salini Costruttori Sp.A. v. Jordan, ICSID ARB/02/13 (2004) (Decision on
Jurisdiction).
164. Telenor Mobile Commc'n A.S. v. Hungary, ICSID ARB/04/15 (2006) (Award).
165. Id. at 92
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ECUADOR'S OIL AND

GAS

EXCLUSION AND

SUBSEQUENT WITHDRAWAL

1. Background
The adoption of free-market policies began in Ecuador in the presidency of Sixto Durin Ball6n in the early 1990S.166 President Durin implemented a series of free market policies in order to open the country to
foreign capital.16 7 For these means, Ecuador became part of the World
Trade Organization ("WTO") in 1996,168 and signed approximately
twenty-five percent of its BITs during the last year of Durin's presidency.1 69 Notwithstanding the efforts to liberalize FDI, the political instability of Ecuador grew after Durin; in fact from 1996 to 2000 Ecuador
had four presidents. But, from 1992 to 1994 the levels of FDI tripled
"and subsequently doubled from 1996 to 1998."'no Even though unprecedented levels of inflation (more than 100 percent) accelerated the crisis in
1998, the inflows of FDI remained stable. In part, this increase happened
because the "lion's share" of the FDI in the 1990s went to the oil and gas
sector (more than 80 percent), 17 1 and those type of investments, once
completed, tend to be less volatile and last for longer periods of time.
President Mahuad aggravated the social and political turmoil in Ecuador in 1998 when he announced the decision to dollarize the economy by
making its currency, the Sucre, obsolete. 172 Two years later Mahuad was
ousted and his Vice-President Gustavo Noboa assumed office. 7 3 Noboa
restored some of the lost stability during his presidency when the dollarization, announced by Mahuad, was implemented and when he undertook important infrastructure projects, such as the construction of a
major pipeline.174 Noboa's successor, Colonel Lucio Gutierrez assumed
control of the government on January 15, 2003, but was later impeached
for charges of corruption and ousted from power. 75 Alfredo Palacio, Gutierrez' Vice-President, assumed office for the remaining twenty
166. Ecuador, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, available at http://www.britannica.com/

EBchecked/topic/1 78721/Ecuador.
167. Ecuador, CIA WORi D FACI300K, 1996, http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/

wofact96/79.htm.
168.

UNrrTE

NATIONS

CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV, INVESTMENT Poticy RE-

vIew: EcUADOR 88 (2001), availableat http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipcmisc2

169.
170.
171.
172.

en.pdf.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 10.
See Hale E. Sheppard, Dollarization Of Ecuador: Sound Policy Dictates U.S. Assistance To This Economic Guinea Pig Of Latin America, 11 IND. INT'L & COMP.
L. REv. 79, 86 (2000).

173. Id. at 88-89.
174. Id. at 88-93.
175. Roberto Ortiz de ZArate, Lucio Gutidrrez Borbuia, CONFEDERATION Of INI)IGENOUS PEOPLE OF BOLIVIA, Nov. 11, 2009, http://www.cidob.org/es/documentacion/

biografiaslideres_politicos/america del sur/ecuador/Iucio-gutierrezborbua.
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months. 176 In the following elections in 2006, Noboa won the first round,
but lost the second round to Rafael Correa, who was running on an antiestablishment platform that won him the presidency.1 77
Correa's victory came in a particularly stressful year for Ecuador's
FDI. In fact, by 2006 "Ecuador was in the final stages of negotiating a
free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States, but that progress
stalled with an April 2006 hydrocarbons law mandating revisions in contract terms."17 8 In May 2006, the Palacio Administration ordered the
seizure of the assets of Occidental Petroleum, who was at the time Ecuador's largest investor.' 7 9 This late measure of President Palacio resulted
in one of the largest claims ever filed before ICSID. 8 0
After assuming office, Correa announced his decision to halt the FTAs
talks, and in October 2007 the Correa administration imposed a new tax
on many foreign oil companies operating in Ecuador, ordering them to
pay ninety-nine percent of their extraordinary income to the government.18 Probably, to avoid a wave of new claims related to oil and gas
the Ecuadorian government decided to exclude its consent to arbitrate
this class of claims, and more recently, decided to denounce the Washington Convention and all its BITs.182 Notwithstanding this, in the last years
major oil companies have sued Ecuador before ICSID. Once any of
these still pending cases reach a final decision, its eventual enforcement
or non-enforcement and any potential consequences for Ecuador will ultimately test the effectiveness of the ICSID system as an ideal mechanism
to protect FDI. 8 3
176. Roberto Ortiz de ZArate, Alfredo Palacio Gonzdlez, CONFEDERATION OF INDIGE-

Boi iVIA, Mar. 1, 2010, http://www.cidob.orgles/documentacion/
biografias_1ideres-politicos/america delsur/ecuador/alfredopalaciogonzalez.
See Ecuador Swears in New President, BBC NiEws, Jan. 16, 2007, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/6262555.stm.
Background Note: Ecuador, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, May 24, 2010, http://www.state.
gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35761.htm.
Ecuador Cancels an Oil Deal with Occidental Petroleum, N.Y. TIMEs, May 17,
2006, at C12.
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Ecuador, ARB/06/11 (2008) (Decision on Jurisdiction) (According to an Associated Press release, Occidental Petroleum is seeking
more than $1 billion in relief. Ecuador Has 'No Confidence' in World Bank Review, TAI'ir TIMEs, May 12, 2008, at 10. Regarding the legal nature of the claim,
according to the decision on jurisdiction by the arbitral tribunal in the case Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Republic of Ecuador: "On 15 May 2006, the Minister of Energy and Mines
notified OEPC of his decision to terminate the Participation Contract by declaring
its caducidad. The Claimants filed their Request for Arbitration two days later on
17 May 2006.").
NOUS PFOPLE oi

177.
178.
179.
180.

181.

Ecuador Rejects U.S. Free Trade Pact, TRADE OBSERVATORY, Dec. 10 2006, http://

www.iatp.org/tradeobservatory/headlines.cfm?reflD=96647; Ecuador decides to
keep 99 percent of oil windfall profits, AFP, Oct. 4 2007, http://afp.google.com/
article/ALeqM5iU8Xf_1y203xFcBcDUrBEPVeMZXQ.
182. Memorandum from John L. Gardiner et al., Partners, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Ecuador Moves to Denounce and Leave (June 17, 2009) available at
http://www.martindale.com/members/Article Atachment.aspx?od=124454&id=73
0598&filename=asr-730600.Ecuador.pdf.
183. Notwithstanding its withdrawal from ICSID, there are six claims against Ecuador
still pending in ICSID. These are: Corporaci6n Quiport S.A. v. Ecuador, ICSID
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2. Legal Analysis of Ecuador's Exclusion
On December 4, 2007 the Republic of Ecuador formally notified to the
ICSID Secretariat that it would not consent to Centre's jurisdiction in
"disputes that arise in matters concerning the treatment of investment in
economic activities related to the exploitation of natural resources, such
as oil, gas, minerals, or others."18 4 The basis of such notification is found
in §25(4) of the Washington Convention:
Any Contracting State may, at the time of ratification, acceptance or
approval of this Convention or at any time thereafter, notify the Centre of the class or classes of disputes which it would or would not
consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the Centre. The SecretaryGeneral shall forthwith transmit such notification to all Contracting
States. Such notification shall not constitute the consent required by
paragraph (1).185 (emphasis added).
In fact, these kinds of exclusions serve the purpose of limiting the scope
of the Centre's jurisdiction, as was established in the case Ceskoslovenska
Obchodni Banka, a.s. v. The Slovak Republic.186 In this case the tribunal
reasoned that if a Contracting State wishes to exclude a particular investment from the reach of the Convention, §25(4) provides a more suitable
way to do so, rather than challenging the meaning of the term 'investment' under the Convention. The tribunal reasoned that the "acceptance
of the Centre's jurisdiction with respect to the rights and obligations arising out of its agreement creates a strong presumption that it considered
its transaction to be an investment within the meaning of the ICSID Convention." 8 7 Furthermore, the arbitral tribunal stated that:

184.

185.
186.
187.

ARB/09/23 (construction of airport facilities); Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co.
Int'l v. Ecuador, ICSID ARB/08/4 (regarding hydrocarbon concession; alleged
breach of Ecuador-U.S. BIT); Burlington Res., Inc. v. Ecuador, ICSID ARB/08/5;
Perenco Ecuador Ltd v. Ecuador, ICSID ARB/08/6 (regarding hydrocarbon concession; alleged breach of Ecuador-France BIT); Repsol YPF Ecuador,S.A. v. Ecuador, ICSID ARB/08/10 (regarding a contract of oil exploration); Occidental
Petroleum Corp. v. Ecuador, ICSID ARB/06/11 (regarding hydrocarbon
concession).
Communication No. 56354/GM from the Minister of Foreign Relations of Ecuador
to ICSID's Secretary General, (Nov. 23, 2007) (providing La Repiblica de Ecuador no consentird en someter a la jurisdicci6n del CIADI, las diferencias que
surjan en materias relativas a] tratamiento de una inversion, que se deriven de
actividades econ6micas relativas al aprovechamiento de recursos naturales como
petr6leo, gas, minerales u otros. Todo instrumento contentivo de la voluntad
previamente expresada por la Repdblica del Ecuador en someter esta clase de
diferencias a la jurisdicci6n del Centro, que no se haya perfeccionado mediante el
expreso y explicito consentimiento de la otra parte previa la fecha de presentaci6n
de esta notificaci6n, es retirado por la Repdblica del Ecuador, con eficacia inmediata a partir de esta fecha).
Washington Convention, supra note 11, art. 25(4).
Gaillard, supra note 132 (citing teskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. Slovakia,
ICSID ARB/97/4 (1999) (Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction) (Professor E.
Gaillard represented the Respondents in this case).
teskoslovenska Obchodnf Banka, A.S. v. Slovakia, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ICSID ARB/97/4, at $166 (1999).
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It is worth noting, in this connection, that a Contracting State that
wishes to limit the scope of the Centre's jurisdiction can do so by making the declaration provided for in Article 25(4) of the Convention.
The Slovak Republic has not made such a declaration and has, therefore, submitted itself broadly to the full scope of the subject matter
jurisdiction governed by the Convention. 18 18 (emphasis added).
Applying the tribunal's reasoning to Ecuador, after the December 4,
2007 notification the country has limited the scope of the Centre's jurisdiction in disputes arising from natural resources investments, including
oil & gas, mineral, and others. In other words, by limiting the scope of
ICSID's jurisdiction, Ecuador may not be sued anymore in those types of
cases. An interesting consideration at this point is that some of the detractors of the offer-to-consent theory in BITs do not see any problem in
a country effectively excluding the Centre's jurisdiction for a particular
class of claims. For instance, Professor Gaillard wrote that:
While §72 of the Convention sets forth the effect of a state's denunciation in relation to its rights and obligations under the Convention,
there is no comparable provision addressing the effect of a notification pursuant to §25(4). An investor's position is therefore more uncertain, even where the investment was made prior to the state's
notification under §25(4).189 (emphasis added).
Professor Gaillard's explanation is based on the nature of the notification and not on the consent of the parties, which in turn is required by
§25(1) in order to assert the jurisdiction of the Centre in a particular case.
Such consent, once given may not be withdrawn.
According to Gaillard a §25(4) notification is neither an expression of
consent nor a lack thereof.' 9 0 But the issue that has been omitted from
this reasoning is what would happen when the consent for a particular
dispute arises from a BIT that is still in force and the host country has
subsequently excluded that particular class of claims. If, under Professor
Gaillard's approach, the country may successfully exclude a particular
type of claims from the Centre's jurisdiction, but may not do it through
the denunciation of the Washington Convention (in case of having BITs
with unqualified consent language still in force), then it would be possible
to arrive to the counter-intuitive conclusion that in many situations exclusion is a more radical move than denunciation.
A significant legal issue that may arise from the topic of exclusion is
whether exclusion may be used retroactively. This was addressed in the
third case ever filed in ICSID, a contractual arbitration case: Alcoa Minerals Jamaica v. Jamaica.'9'
In 1968, Alcoa entered into an investment contract with Jamaica for the
construction of an Alumina refining plant in exchange for a series of tax
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at $ 65.
Gaillard, supra note 132.
Id.
Id.
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concessions, including a 'no-further-tax' clause and long-term leases for
the mining of bauxite. 192 This agreement contained an ICSID arbitration
clause. 193 In 1974 the Jamaican government indicated that the revenue
from the mining of bauxite would be unilaterally increased, but since the
parties could not reach an agreement on this issue, the government imposed a new tax on bauxite by enacting the Bauxite Act, which dramati94
cally increased the government's revenue from the mining of bauxite.1
But prior to the enactment of the Bauxite Act the Jamaican government
notified the Centre, in accordance with §25(4), of the exclusion of disputes arising out from investments related to natural resources. 95 For
this reason, when Alcoa decided to sue Jamaica before ICSID, Jamaica,
relying on §25(4), did not appear before the ICSID Tribunal. 19 6 Nonetheless, the Tribunal found jurisdiction by deciding the issue of whether
Jamaica's notification had the effect of withdrawing natural resources investment disputes from the scope of Jamaica's prior consent to
arbitrate.' 9 7
The Tribunal's ruling in Alcoa on the consent to arbitrate is of crucial
importance today. The tribunal found that the sole agreement of the parties to stipulate an ICSID arbitration clause constituted the consent required by §25(1), which may not be unilaterally withdrawn thereafter.
Section 25(4)'s notification, according to the Tribunal, only operates for
the future. A decision finding otherwise, "would very largely, if not
wholly, deprive the Convention of any practical value."' 9 8 To celebrate
this decision an author wrote that "the Alcoa Minerals result demonstrates the success of the ICSID Convention in dealing with the problem
of State obligation to arbitrate, and the decision is a reassurance to the
many investors presently relying upon ICSID arbitration clause." 9 9
Even though the Alcoa case involved a form of contractual consent (a
clause compromissoire), it does reveal that a country may not step back
on the issue of consent once it has acquired an irrevocable international
obligation, such as the obligation that Jamaica had to appear before ICSID in cases related to its 1968 Alumina/Bauxite contract with Alcoa.
The case with Ecuador is potentially structurally different. After the formal notification of the exclusion it is clear that the country may not be
hailed into ICSID in cases concerning new investments. But the afore192. W. Michael Tupman, Case Studies in the Jurisdiction of the InternationalCentrefor
Settlement of Investment Disputes, 35 INT'L & Comp. L. Q. 813, 821 (1996).
193. Id
194. Id.
195. Id
196. Id at 822.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See John T. Schmidt, Arbitration Under the Auspices of the InternationalCentre for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID): Implications of the Decision on Jurisdiction in Alcoa Minerals Jamaica, Inc. v. Government of Jamaica, 17 HARV.
INTr'L. L. J. 90, 93 (1976).
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mentioned issue of foreign investments done in light of BITs in effect,
prior to the formal notification, remains unanswered.
In order to answer this question one should undertake an analysis of
the issue of consent similar to the one performed with Bolivia's denunciation of the Washington Convention. For instance, under the theory of
offer-to-consent Ecuador will no longer be bound to appear before ICSID in cases that have not been filed prior to the notification of the formal exclusion, even if the investments were made before the exclusion
and under the coverage of a BIT that is still in force. Conversely, under
the theory of [just] consent Ecuador could still be subject to the Centre's
jurisdiction in cases related to natural resources, notwithstanding the formal notification, if the investments were made prior to such notification
under the coverage of a BIT that is still in force. Notwithstanding this,

some supporters of the latter agree with the former

result. 20 0

The jurisdictional outcome of these five cases, Murphy, Burlington,
Quirport, Perenco, and Repsol, will be extremely important for the Ecuadorian economy, and also for the future of the ICSJD in the region. If the
ICSID tribunals decide to assert jurisdiction in these cases, Ecuador may
be on the eve of facing potentially disastrous financial distress. On the
one hand, such events could accelerate and give momentum to a move in
the Latin American region against ICSID. On the other hand, these
eventual decisions, as happened with the Alcoa case in the 1970s, may
"better secure the good faith performance of investment agreements..
[by showing] that foreign investment need not be subject to national
whim."12 0 ' Arguably, such a scenario could positively impact the fate of
ICSID in the long run.
C.

VENEZUELA'S INVES-rMENT PROTEC-riON APPROACH

1. Background
The father of Venezuelan opening for FDI in the early 1990s was President Carlos Andr6s P6rez, whose second term in office lasted four
years. 2 02 After an impeachment on corruption charges, the Supreme
Court ousted him from power in 1992.203 Perez's presidency undertook a
major reform in the country that has been called "neo-liberal." Among
the most relevant aspects of such reform were: (i) a major privatization
of the country's public companies, including a national airline, the national phone company, and different electricity companies; (11)a liberalization of the interest rates, which, up until then were fixed by the
Ministry of Finance; and (iii) a rise of the price of gas.
These reforms proved to be very unpopular. In fact, P6rez experienced
great political turmoil during his second term in office. The first major
200. See Gaillard, supra note 132, at 2.
201. Schmidt, supra note 199, at 108.
202. H. MICIIAuL TAR VER, TimE RISE ANI)

FAL L OF VI-NI-ZU1JLAN PRESIDENT CARLOS
ANDRI'S Pr-RFZ VoLumE, 2: TiJE LATER YEARS 1973-2004 (2005).

203. Id.
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hardship of Perez's presidency took place only twenty-five days after he
took the presidential oath, on February 27, 1989 .204 An unprecedented
social revolt (known as the Caracazo) marked the unpopularity of the
free-market reforms proposed by P6rez in his presidential campaign.
Years after the Caracazo, Perez suffered two failed coup-d'Etats in February and November of 1992 respectively. 2 0 5 A highlight of the February 4,
1992 coup-d'Etat was the appearance on television of Lieutenant Hugo
Ch~ivez, who was one of the heads of the defeated rebels. In a brief
speech addressed to his colleagues, Ch~ivez called for a cease-fire, personally assumed responsibility, and recognized the failure of the coup "for
now. "206

After P~rez's impeachment, the head of the Venezuelan Congress, Ram6n J. VelAsquez, served for the remainder of the presidential term. 20 7
In 1993 elections, former President Rafael Caldera was elected for a second term in office .2 08 During Caldera's second presidency, Venezuela experienced a rapid downward economic spiral. The government's
response included the continuation of several of the unpopular economic
measures adopted by Perez. Among the measures implemented in the
framework of a program called Agenda Venezuela, were: the liberalization of the interest rates, the raise of the price of fuel, the devaluation of
the currency rate, the imposition of a foreign currency exchange control
regime, and the further opening of the oil sector to FDI, through the
continuation of a program called the Apertura Petrolera.2 09
But the social, economical, and legal scenario would radically change in
Venezuela after the December 1998 elections, when Ch~ivez gained
power. The arrival of a former insurrectionist to power, four years after
being condemned by the incumbent President Caldera, would drastically
halt the free-market measures implemented by the past governments. In
fact, when President Ch~ivez took office in February 1998, he promised a
major reform of the National Constitution, and the saturation of a new
204. George Ciccariello-Maher-Counterpunch, The Fourth World War Started in Venezuela, VENI.ZUEJ -A ANAL YSIS.COM, Mar. 5, 2007, http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/2253.
205. Id.
206. See id
207. Human Rights Foundation, International Council, http://www.humanrightsfoundation.org/i ntern ationalcou nci1. h tml1.
208. Rafael Caldera: President of Venezuela 1969-74 and 1994-1999, TimiES, Dec. 29,
2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tollcomment/obituaries/article6969744.ece.
209. The Apertura Petrolera program was based on a lax interpretation given to section
5 of the Organic Law that Reserves to the State the Industry and Trade of Hydrocarbons of 1975 (a.k.a., the Nationalization law). This article provided for the joint
participation of private capital along with the Sate, in: (i) operating agreements;
(ii) strategic associations (e.g., Cerro Negro, Petrozuata, Sincor, and Hamaca upgrading projects); and (iii) association agreements. By the same token, the State
had to retained control over these projects, in accordance with the same section 5
of the Nationalization Law. The program was gradually implemented in three
stages or 'rounds.' The first and second rounds took place during Pdrez, and Veldzquez, and the last one was carried out by Caldera. See Decree 1404 of 1/20/76,
available at http://www.glin.gov/view.action?glinl D=1 501.
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economic system. 2 10 In 1999, a new Constitution was passed by a National Constituent Assembly, and following the passage of the new Constitution the ChAvez Administration gradually implemented a major legal
reform, including the enactment of a new Hydrocarbons Law in 2001.211
Such reforms gave momentum to major strikes and public manifestations
of discontent, which resulted in the ousting of Chivez in April of 2002 for
two days. Shortly after his return to power, Chivez became more drastic
in the implementation of his programs. Finally in February 2005, President Chivez said for the first time that his programs and policies were all
directed towards the "Socialism of the 21st Century." 2 12
Meanwhile, the ChAvez Administration announced the strict application of the Hydrocarbons Law of 2001 through the implementation of the
programs Plena Soberania Petrolera2 13 and Siembra Petrolera.2 14 These
programs involved a process of renegotiation of oil contracts with private
investors and a consequent dramatic increase of the country's share in the
profits. The Apertura Petrolera had died. Yet some of the investors resisted until the end, to the mandated process of migration from a private
to a mixed corporate form, involving a majority stake in the hands of the
State. These investors, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips, preferred to sue
Venezuela before ICSID during the last trimester of 2007.215
Whilst announcing the arrival of Socialism to Venezuela, Chdvez commenced a series of expropriations and nationalizations that changed the
panorama for foreign investors and FDI. The first expropriations were
targeted at agricultural farms and two of the highest-profile cases were
Hato La Marquesedia, and Hato El Charcote.216 The latter belonged to
the Vestey Group, from the United Kingdom, who decided to sue Venezuela before ICSID in 2006.217 Recently, some other strategic areas that
have been targeted by the government include: telecommunications, by
210. Background Note: Venezuela, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Feb. 25, 2010, http://www.

state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35766.htm.
211. Id.
212. See Mary Pili Hernindez, ZQud es el Socialismo del Siglo XXI?, APPOREA, Dec.

13, 2006, http://www.aporrea.org/ideologia/a22833.html; see also Venezuela: The
Chdvez Effect, REVISTA: HARv. REV. LATIN AM., Fall 2008.
213. FINANCIAL AND OPERATIONAL INFORMATION, PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA S.A.

AND SUBSIDIARIES 30 (2007), available at http://www.pdvsa.comlinterface.sp/
database/fichero/free/3271/245.pdf.
214. See generally Rafael Ramfrez, President of Petroleos de Venezuela, Presentation
of PDVSA's Strategic Plans, and Plan Siembra Petrolera at Caracas Hilton Hotel
(Aug. 19, 2005) available at http://www.pdvsa.com.

215. See Mobil Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27
(2007); ConocoPhillips Co. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/30 (2007).
216. Reports on Venezuela: UNPD and ECLA Indicators, Democraciray Desarrollo
Democracy and Development, VENEZUELA TODAY, Sept. 14, 2005, http://www.
venezuelatoday.org/05-09-14 in.htm.

217. See Vestey Group Ltd v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/4
(2006) (some press releases have reported that the parties settled the case a month
after the filing of the claim in ICSID on March 14, 2006); see UK Farm Group

Settles BIT Claim Over Venezuelan Land Seizures and Invasions, INV. TREATY
NEws, April 11, 2006, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn-aprill1 2006.pdf.
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the announcement of the de-privatization of the national phone company
(CANTV); electricity, by the announcement of the de-privatization of the
Caracas' power company (Electricidad de Caracas); and cement, by the
announcement of the acquisition of the four largest cement companies
(Andino, Caribe-Holcim, LaVega-Lafarge, and Vencemos-Cemex). These
cases have also resulted in two ICSID claims against Venezuela. 2 18
Notwithstanding that Venezuela has settled four of the six cases already before ICSJD, 21 9 the only two cases that have reached to an arbitral award did not involve large amounts. 2 20 Venezuela has taken some
anti-arbitration measures directly targeted to potential claims that may
arise out of the recent expropriations and nationalizations. Aside from
the hostile political discourse against ICSID, the two most important antiarbitration steps taken by the country are the denunciation of the Venezuela-Netherlands BIT 22 1 and the Supreme Tribunal's Decision number
1541 of October 17, 2008.222 Yet the effects of these anti-arbitration measures remains to be seen in the other four cases against Venezuela cur-

rently outstanding before ICSID, 2 23 and in any other potential claim that
may be filed in the near future.
2.

Investment Protection Law and Decision 1541

This decision was delivered by the Constitutional Chamber of the Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal, which is the highest court in the country, and
also the only court whose decisions set binding judicial precedent (erga
omnes effects). An interesting aspect about this decision is that it was
rendered after a petition for the interpretation of §258 of the Venezuelan
Constitution, filed by representatives of Venezuela's Attorney General
218. See Brandes Inv. Partners, LP v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No.
ARB/08/3 (2008) (the Brandes Fund owned a minority stake in CANTV);
CEMEX Caracas Invs. B. V. and CEMEX CaracasII Invs. B. V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARI3/08/15 (2008).
219. Cases settled: (i) GRAD Assocs., P.A. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID
Case No. ARB/00/3 (2000); (ii) I&I Beheer B.Y. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/4 (2005); (iii) Eni Daci6n B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of
Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/0714 (2007); and (iv) Vestey Group, Case No. ARB/
06/4 (2006).
220. The Venezuelan cases that have been decided on the merits by an ICSID Tribunal
are: Autopista Concesionariade Venez., ICSID Case No.ARB/0015 (2001) (Decision on Jurisdiction) (in which the tribunal awarded the investors $12 million of
the over $150 million requested); and, Fedax NV v. Neth., ICSID Case No ARB/
96/3 (1998) (Award) (in which the tribunal awarded the investors with approximately $810,000, when $600,000 were recognized by Venezuela).
221. Gaillard, supra note 132, at 3 (Venezuela notified the Netherlands of the termination of the Venezuela-Netherlands BIT, to become effective on December 31,
2008; nonetheless, the BIT's survival clause would keep the instrument in force for
an extra 15 year period of time).
222. See Decision 1541of the Constitutional Chamber of the Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal, published on Oct. 17, 2008, available at http://www.tsj.gob.ve.
223. The Venezuelan cases still outstanding in ICSID are: (i) Vannessa Ventures Ltd. v.
Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/6 (2004); (ii) Mobil
Corp.; (iii), ConocoPhillips Co.; (iv) Brandes Inv. Partners; and, (v) CEMEX Caracas In vs. I & II.
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Such constitutional mandate provides that "the law shall en-

courage arbitration, conciliation, mediation and any other alternative
means for resolving conflicts."122 5 The object of the Attorney General's
petition of interpretation was to limit the constitutional reach of §22 of
the Law Concerning the Promotion and Protection of Investment (LPPI),
thereby excluding any consent of the Republic to arbitration on the basis
of a unilateral consent contained in this provision. Section 22 of the LPPI
establishes that:
Any dispute arising between an international investor whose country
of origin has in effect an agreement for promotion and protection of
investments with Venezuela, or any disputes to which the provisions
of the Articles of Association of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) or the Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States (ICSJD)
shall be submitted to international arbitration under the terms provided for in the respective treaty or agreement, should it so provide,
without prejudice to the possibility of using the systems of litigation
provided for in the Venezuelan laws in force, when applicable. 2 26
(emphasis added).
The motivation of the Attorney General's petition was narrowed to
concerns caused recently by disputes arising from the renegotiation of the
major oil & gas projects, in other words, as a response to ExxonMobil
and ConocoPhillips ICSID claims. Furthermore, the Tribunal in the
'whereas' section of the decision referred to the petitioners arguments
and established that:
[the possibility of] hailing Venezuela into arbitral tribunals is present,
as a reaction of some companies that have felt affected by nationalists
measures taken by the Government, such as: those related to the affirmation of the absolute sovereignty over the oil (plena soberanfa petrolera) through the elimination of the Strategic Associations
operating in the Orinoco's Oil Belt and its conversion into mixed cor-

porations, in the form established by the Hydrocarbons

Law. 227

(em-

phasis added).
The approach adopted by the Supreme Tribunal was based on a purposive interpretation of the language of the law. The Supreme Tribunal analyzed the Investment Protections Laws of fourteen countries to conclude
that the "international tendency is to establish clear dispositions [in the
law] in regards to the unilateral consent of the State to the jurisdiction of
an arbitral tribunal."12 2 8 Likewise, the Supreme Tribunal relied upon the
224. Moreover, the representatives of the Attorney General who filed the petition of
interpretation are closely related to the current management of PDVSA, Venezuela's state-owned oil company.
225. Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venez. art. 258.
226. Inv. Promotion and Protection Law, Code Civil [356] art 22 (Venez.).
227. El Tribunal Supremo de Justica [Supreme Tribunal], Decision 08-0763 (Venez.)
available at http://www.tsj.gov.ve/decisiones/scon/Octubre/1541 -171008-08-0763.
htm.
228. Id.
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opinion of Professor Schreuer, who said that,
[T]he host State may offer consent to arbitration in general terms to
foreign investors or to certain categories of foreign investors in its
legislation. However, not every reference to investment arbitrationin
national legislation amounts to consent to jurisdiction.Therefore, the
respective provisions in national laws must be studied carefully. 22 9
(emphasis added).
Thus, the Supreme Tribunal held that the meaning of the phrase "shall
be submitted to international arbitration under the terms provided for in
the respective treaty or agreement" contained in §22 of the LPPI, "denotes . . . that the intent of the legislator relates expressly and unequivocally to the internal content of the respective treaties," 230 and not to a
unilateral consent of the Republic to submit any investment dispute to
arbitration. According to the Tribunal, a converse interpretation would
cause the absurd result that a sole mention of the Washington Convention by the Municipal Law of a country would automatically translate into
the assertion of the country's consent, as required by §25(1) of the Convention, to submit a particular dispute to arbitration.2 31
Moreover, in a scholarly article by Ms. Hildegard Rondon de Sanso,
who is a prominent former Justice of the Venezuelan Supreme Court and
a very influential figure linked to the Venezuelan Oil industry, she expressed her rejection for an interpretation of §22 LPPI as establishing
unilateral consent.232 Ms. Rondon de Sanso heavily criticized former legislator Dr. Allan Brewer Carfas, who said that the words "shall be submitted to international arbitration" in §22 LPPI implies the express
consent of the country to submit the controversies to international arbitration. 233 Interesting enough, Ms. Rondon de Sanso tries to make an
exegetical distinction in the norm, which also contains the phrase "as established thereunder" ("si asiste lo establece"). 2 34 Ms. Rondon de Sanso
found further fundamental grounds to the decision 1541 in the current
legal framework of Venezuela. But Ms. Rondon de Sanso's own opinions
expressed in the media reveal political or ideological biases in her legal
analysis of this area. 235 For instance, another prominent and respected
229. Christoph Schreuer, Consent to Arbitration, Feb. 27, 2007, http://www.univie.ac.at/
intlaw/wordpress/pdf/88_conarbitr_89.pdf.
230. Decision 1541, supra note 222.
231. Id.
232. Hildegard Rondon de Sanson, El Consentimiento del Estado para el Arbitraje en el
CIA DI y la Interpretaci6ndel Articulo 22 de la Ley de Inversiones de Venezuela,
ACADEMIA NACIONAL D)E DERECIO Y CIENCIAS SOCIALES 113 CORDOBA, Jan. 11,
2009, http://www.acaderc.org.ar/doctrina/articulos/el-consentimiento-del-estadopara-el-arbitraje-en.

233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See Hildegard Rond6n de Sans6n, Ciadi, Arbitraje y Ley de Inversiones, AroRREA, FEB. 25, 2009, www.aporrea.org/actualidadla73220.html (Ms. Rondon de
Sanso stated that "[con el paso del tiempo, el Convenio del CIADI ha demostrado
que no posee el rigimen de soluci6n de controversiasque mtds nos favorezca, ya que
nos obliga a someternos a un derecho que es la negaci6n de los principios con-
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practitioner in Venezuela opined that "[i]t is widely thought that the government's request for interpretation of article 22 was an attempt to
weaken the position of certain foreign investors currently pursuing ICSID
cases against Venezuela." 236
By the same token, it is important to remark that the Supreme Tribunal
found its decision to be consistent with the accepted principles of international law in this matter. 23 7 For this reason, the Tribunal referred to the
criterion developed by an ICSID tribunal in the case Southern Pacific
Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 2 3 8 according to
which "even though the consent contained in a law may not be interpreted broadly or narrowly, it can only be interpreted objectively under
the principle of good faith... ."239 Therefore, the Supreme Tribunal distinguished the Venezuelan provision from similar provisions of other countries, such as the one discussed in Southern Pacific, finding this reading to
be in accord with the international principle of good faith.
It is likely that the most important effect of Decision 1541 would be
that if an ICSID tribunal asserts jurisdiction on the basis of the unilateral
consent of the Republic as contained in §22 of the LPPI, a potential adverse award would not be enforceable within the boundaries of Venezuela. In fact, the Supreme Tribunal expressly stated that "in case that
the decision of the respective organism violates the internal juridical system, such decision would be unenforceable in the Republic." 240
An interesting study of the issue of consent to ICSID arbitration as
contained in §22 LPPI disagrees with the Supreme Tribunal's finding.24 1
The author of this study tries to reconcile a textual interpretation of the
norm with the ultimate goals of the investor-State system of protection,
by stating that: "[t]he fact that the law uses the term 'shall' and not 'may'
could be of tremendous importance if a foreign investor were to rely on
this provision to bring a case before ICSID, as it could make the allega-

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

tenidos en nuestro proceso hasta llegar, incluso al extremo de no priorizarla decisi6n de la cuesti6n de competencia, sino de permitir que la misma se debata
conjuntamente con el fondo (que es como ponerse los zapatos antes que las medias).
En s[ntesis, el arbitrajees para Venezuela, ir a litigarante jueces extranjeros, con un
idioma y un sistema procesal que nos son ajenos. Ademds, los tribunales que se
ubican segtin los intereses de los drbitros, implican onerosisimos desplazamientos,
no solo de los abogadosy representantes,sino tambidn de los expertos y los testigos.
Lo anteriorexige que se replantee si existe la necesidad, la conveniencia y la legitimidad de figuras como el arbitrajeinternacional,el CIA DI y el actual rigimen de
protecci6n de las inversiones extranjeras") (emphasis added).
Venezuelan Court Rules on Article 22, GLOI3AiL ARB. REV., Nov. 3, 2008, http://
eanzola.com/images/uploads/Venezuelan courtarticle22.pdf.
Id.
Decision 1541, supra note 222.
Id.
See id.
See Thomas Pate, The Past,Present,and Future of the ForeignArbitration Clause in
ForeignInvestment Legislation: In Pursuit of The Balance at 76, available at http://
www.desolapate.com/publicaciones/The%20Past%20Present%20and %20Future
%20of%20the%20Arbitral %20Caluse%20in %20Foreign%20Investment%2OLegislation,%20In %20Pursuit%20of%20The%20Balance.pdf.
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tion that the state committed itself to arbitrate.1 24 2 Nonetheless, the appreciation of this author regarding the future of this topic (as expressed in
a footnote) proved to be exactly correct:
In any event, in recent years Venezuela has been involved in several
significant international arbitrations that have been distasteful for
the government and as a result it may be expected that Venezuela
will move to reduce its exposure to international arbitral jurisdiction
as, indeed, it has done with respect to the new petroleum sector joint

ventures signed in early

2006.243

Another, more recent study has also been prophetic about this particular issue and the potential effects of decision 1541:
Venezuela is nonetheless very likely to seek all possible injunctions
in order to avoid international arbitration.... Even if a plaintiff company is able to subj.ect Venezuela to an internationalarbitrationtribunal's jurisdictionand subsequently win on the merits, unless there has
been a separate waiver of immunity from enforcement of any successful arbitration award, a state or state enterprise may still claim
sovereign immunity from enforcement of the award .2 44 (emphasis
added).
A final aspect to highlight on the Decision 1541 is its reference to the
country's consent contained in BITs. In one part of the decision, the Supreme Tribunal stated that depending on the language of a particular
BIT, by subscribing to it a country may be pledging its consent to further
arbitrations. 2 45 But in the last part of the decision the Supreme Tribunal
added an ambiguous paragraph, whose interpretation would define Venezuela's future approach to ICSID:
Finally we reiterate that the sole subscription of the ICSID Convention, by one, several, or all the States linked in the subject of investments by BITs, or MITs, does not constitute an automatic submission
of the respective disputes to the procedures contained in such Convyention; being essential, at all times, the existence of a written unequivocal
2 46
consent to arbitrate."1
(emphasis added).

The polar question that remains open with Venezuela is whether it will
further accept the Centre jurisdiction and potential adverse awards in
cases where consent has arisen both from the LPPI, and a BIT in effect,
or whether Venezuela will adopt more radical solutions, such as a withdrawal A la Bolivia, or an exclusion and withdrawal A la Ecuador, or an
annulment request attitude towards enforcement of an ICSID award A la
Argentina. In spite of explosive anti-ICSID declarations by representatives of the Venezuelan government, Venezuela has not yet adopted a
242. Id.
243. Id. at 77 n. 230.
244. Brandon Marsh, Preventingthe Inevitable: The Benefits of ContractualRisks Engineering in Light of Venezuela's Recent Oil Field Nationalization, 13 STAN. J.L. Bus.
& FIN. 453, 474 (2008).
245. Decision 1541, supra note 222.
246. Id.
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drastic anti-ICSID measure . 24 7
In order to answer those questions an element to consider would be the
interlocutory decision of the Political and Administrative Chamber of the
Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal, in the case Autopista Concesionada de
Venezuela (Aucoven) .2 4 8 In this case the Supreme Tribunal dismissed a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, filed by the foreign investor, on the grounds that the Nation waived its right to sue in
domestic courts by including an arbitral clause in the concession agreement with the foreign investor. Indeed, by the time this decision was rendered an ICSID arbitral tribunal had already asserted jurisdiction over
the case. But in Aucoven, the Supreme Tribunal established that the Venezuelan tribunals had to have jurisdiction to hear the case, notwithstanding the existence of a concession agreement with an arbitration clause
vesting the ICSID with exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter .2 4 9
This should provide indication of the willingness of Venezuelan courts to
recognize the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in every case.
Another element, perhaps more shocking, to consider is the political
agreement on the campaign launched by the transnational corporation
ExxonMobil against PDVSA, enacted by the National Assembly on February 13, 2008 and published in the Official Gazette number 38.869. Section V of such agreement of the legislature exhorted the President of the
Republic to denounce the Washington Convention and withdraw from
ICSID. A withdrawal from ICSID would likely cause a massive outflow
of the FDI existing in Venezuela. Such measure in conjunction with the
anti-capitalistic speech of the government and the recent trend of nationalizations, expropriations, and de-privatizations, may send a clear signal
to the markets that the country is no longer interested in receiving or
providing assurances to foreign capital.

D.

CONCLUSIONS-ICSID AND LATIN AMERICA:

A

GRAY AND UNCERTAIN FUTURE

A few decades ago it was argued that the Washington Convention filled
247. Venezuelan Court Rules on Article 22, supra note 236 (according to Alberto
Ravel!, attorney

at King & Spalding in Houston, the Venezuelan government has

strategically issued a favorable judicial interpretation of §22, but without resorting
to drastic measures).
248. See Decision 1753 of the Political and Administrative Chamber of the Venezuelan
Supreme Tribunal, (Nov. 18, 2003) available at http://www.tsj.gob.ve.
249. This case never reached a decision on the merits because on February 10, 2004 the
Republic desisted on the claim by stating that: "after the ICSID award rendered
on November 23, 2003, [. .1Jit would be meaningless to maintain this claim when
there is no object to decide" (free translation from the Spanish text). See Press
Release, Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal, Aclaratoria de Ia Sala Politico Administrativa en caso de Ia autopista Caracas-La Guaira (Feb. 2, 2006), available at http://
www.tsj.gob.ve. Presumably, if the ICSID award would not have favored the Nation (by awarding $12 million out of the $311 million requested), the Republic
would not have desisted on its counter-claim before Venezuelan courts.
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the lacunae left by the famous Barcelona Traction case.25 0 In that case,
the ICJ held that a State could make a claim when investments by its
nationals abroad were prejudicially affected in violation of the right of
the State itself to have nationals enjoy certain standards of treatment previously agreed in a treaty or special agreement. 2 5 1 Yet, the common situation when no such treaty or special agreement existed, thereby covering
the particular conflict, was that investors would be left unprotected.
Here, the Washington Convention and today's system of protection, as
configured by the simultaneous existence of BITs and MITs, fits perfectly
to cover this hole in the laws.
But such assertion would only make sense if the countries in question
are interested in seeking the ultimate goal of the investor-State system of
protection: that of facilitating the flows of capital. In fact, thirty years
ago, Paul Szasz pointed out that one of the reasons why Latin American
Nations initially rejected the Convention was that not every country was
keen to attract foreign capital. 25 2 At the time, it seemed reasonable to
suspect that an anti-capitalistic government would avoid FDI.
But today we live in a different world. Even when the resurgence of the
left in the governments of Latin America have given momentum to a
wide variety of anti-FDI measures, in today's world, the flow of capital
between countries is a reality. Investors, whether from capitalistic, anticapitalistic, or mixed economies, seek protection for their investments
abroad. This reasoning may not apply, however, in cases where public
and not private funds are at stake. By mentioning the new positioning of
Venezuela as a capital-exporter country in Latin America, 25 3 we may find
an explanation to some of the anti-FDI measures commented. Yet this
explanation comes with a caveat: first, even when the traditional forms of
FDI protections are being rejected, new forms of protections will likely
appear; and second, the flow of capital will be impacted by the fluctuations of the price of oil.
The fate of ICSID and the Washington Convention is still uncertain in
Latin America. It is probably too early to predict what would be the
ultimate consequences of Bolivia's withdrawal, Ecuador's exclusion, and
Venezuela's growing reluctance to the Centre. In fact, in a Summit of
UNASUR, 2 54 Venezuela fiercely promoted the creation of an alternative-maybe regional-center of investor-State dispute resolution, as an al250. See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power, Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 1.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5);
see also Charles Vuylsteke, Foreign Investment Protection and ICSJD Arbitration,4
GA. J. INTr'L & Comp. L. 343, 345 (1974).
251. See Summary of the Barcelona Traction, Light & Power, Co. Judgment (Second
Phase), Int'l Court of Justice, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/50/
5389.pdf.
252. See Szasz, supra note 46.
253. See

UNITEI) NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AM:) DE VEi7oPmE-NT, TRAD)E AND)

Ri7PORT 29 (2008), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdr
2008_en.pdf.
254. The Union of South American Nations is a regional multilateral effort, which tries
to integrate the Andean Community Pact, and MERCOSUR.
DE~VEi-OIMENTr
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ternative to ICSID. 2 55 This proposal, if accepted and adopted by Latin
American countries, could jeopardize the future of ICSID, especially if
Brazil agrees to join it. At such an uncertain moment, one would expect
the arising of a new wave of scholarly disagreement in the issue of the
viability of an LCSID withdrawal in mass. If such a time actually comes,
we will find ourselves discussing the issue of consent.
Meanwhile, the ICSID will continue to play a central role in the protection of FDI in the Latin American region. The extent of such role will be
measure by the jurisdictional findings of the ICSID tribunals in the cases
pending against Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. "Now more than
ever," as was once stated, the effectiveness of ICSID arbitration "depends upon the power of the Convention to render agreements to arbitrate mutually binding." 2 5 6

255. See Juan Francisco Alonso, For the TSJ, All Cases are Relevant, We do not Discriminate, Ei- UNIVERSAL ONL INE, Oct. 16, 2008, http://www.eluniversal.com/2008/10/
16/en-pol-espfor-the-tsj,-al-ca16A2073343.shtmI (last visited May 16, 2010).
256. See Schmidt, supra note 199.
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